ROGERS
v.
STATE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2018-06-27
No. 18-0213
246 So. 3d 571 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2018)

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Holding

A writ of prohibition is premature when a petitioner has an adequate remedy available in the trial court, such as a motion to dismiss for violation of the statutory thirty-day trial commencement requirement under the Ryce Act.


Headnotes

[1] A writ of prohibition is not available when a petitioner has an adequate remedy at law available in the trial court, such as a motion to dismiss for violation of statutor…

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Facts & Procedural History

Rogers was subject to a petition for civil commitment as a sexually violent predator under Florida's Ryce Act. He requested a jury trial in open court…

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Opinion of the Court

SUAREZ, J.

Torrance Rogers petitions this Court for a writ of prohibition seeking to dismiss a petition, filed below, for civil commitment of a sexually violent predator (a “Ryce Act” petition). Rogers claims the trial court violated his rights under section 394.916, Florida Statutes (2017), when it did not commence a jury trial within thirty days of his request in open court. Because Rogers has an adequate remedy below, we dismiss his petition for writ of prohibition as premature. See

Osborne v. State, 907 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 2005) (“[Defendant] moved to dismiss the Ryce Act petition against him on the basis that the State failed to bring the case to trial within the thirty days of the trial court's probable cause finding, as required by section 394.916(1), Florida Statutes (1999).”); State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817,

819 (Fla. 2002) (“[W]hile [Defendant] was still being detained without trial, defense counsel filed two additional motions to dismiss the proceedings, and .

. . a hearing on [Defendant’s] motions to dismiss was held before . . . the assigned judge. At the conclusion of the hearing, [the judge] dismissed the proceedings on a violation of the statutory provision requiring a final hearing to commence within thirty days of the ex parte finding of probable cause.”).

Dismissed.


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