BAYDAR
v.
RENAISSANCE CRUISES, INC.
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The court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient contacts between the defendant and the United States to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction over the Jones Act claim.
A seaman sued his employer under the Jones Act for lost wages due to employment-related injuries. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject m…
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K. MICHAEL MOORE, District Judge.
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss (DE #32, filed September3, 1997). Response and Reply have been filed.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint on the grounds that,
inter alia,
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim. The Court interprets this as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction are either “facial” or “factual” attacks.
1
Facial attacks focus on whether the complaint itself states a sufficient allegation of subject matter jurisdiction, whereas factual attacks challenge the existence of subject matter in fact.
2
The present Renewed Motion to Dismiss is a factual attack. When a party undertakes a factual motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court may consider matters outside the pleadings, including testimony and affidavits.
3
Unlike the situation involving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6),
the trial court is free [with a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss] to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the ease____no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiffs allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of the jurisdictional claims.
4
In short, the burden is on the party asserting jurisdiction, in this case Plaintiff, to show that the court does in fact have jurisdiction.
5
Defendant originally filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 25, 1996 on the grounds that,
inter alia,
this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action. The Court entered an Order on December19, 1996 directing the parties to conduct jurisdictional discovery so that the Court could more fully consider the Motion to Dismiss. Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss was filed at the close of that discovery. Pursuant to that discovery, the parties also filed affidavits and other evidentiary material. The Court now considers the Renewed Motion with the benefit of such filings.
Plaintiff, a seaman aboard one of Defendant’s cruise ships, brings suit against Defendant under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688, for recovery of wages allegedly lost through Plaintiffs employment-related injuries. Under the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Lauritzen v. Larsen
6
there are seven relevant factors in determining whether a federal court can exercise jurisdiction
*918
over a Jones Act claim. These factors are: (1) the place of the wrongful act; (2) the law of the flag; (3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman; (4) allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) the place where the contract of employment was made; (6) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum; and (7) the law of the forum.
7
In
Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis,
8
the Supreme Court added what the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted in
Szumlicz v. Norwegian America Line,
Inc,
9
as an eighth factor, “the ‘substantial use of a United States base of operations for the shipping and revenues of the vessel and its owner, together with the other United States contacts.’ ”
10
Plaintiff, in his Response, relies heavily on the Eleventh Circuit’s application of
Rhoditis
in
Szumlicz
for the proposition that the employer’s base of operations is the dispositive factor. However, the more recent Eleventh Circuit opinion in
Sigalas v. Lido Maritime, Inc.11
reemphasized the overarching rule from
Lawritzen
and
Rhoditis
that no one factor is most important as a general matter; every analysis is case-specific.
12
The test is not mechanical.
13
Depending on the facts, a court may give greater consideration to a factor such as the flag, or as in
Rhoditis,
the substantiality of an owner’s contacts with the United States.
14
Therefore, the mere existence of a United States base of operations does not, without more, create federal jurisdiction in this action.
In the cases cited by Plaintiff in his Response where the courts found that there was federal jurisdiction, the existence of a United States base of operations was accompanied by additional United States contacts.
15
In
Szumlicz,
not only was there a U.S. base of operations, but the injury also occurred in the United States, and the vessel at issue and other vessels owned by the defendant regularly called on U.S. ports.
16
Likewise, in
Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos
V,
17
the vessel was in Texas to pick up a shipment of grain, and the plaintiff had flown to Texas to work on the vessel.
18
Even in
Rhoditis,
the plaintiff suffered his injuries in New Orleans, the defendant corporation was owned by a U.S. domiciliary, and the vessel’s regular route was between the U.S. and the Far East.
19
From the evidence presented in the present action, the Court finds that there are no contacts between Defendant and the United States, other than the fact that Defendant’s office is located in Fort Lauderdale and that its officers live in Florida. The Plaintiff is a Turkish national who resides in the United Kingdom. He was a seaman aboard the M/V Regina Renaissance, a Liberian-flagged vessel, whose operational range was South America. Neither the Renaissance, nor other vessels chartered by Defendant, called at U.S. ports. Plaintiffs injury was sustained while the vessel was in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Plaintiffs contract, while executed aboard the vessel, was drafted in the United Kingdom. Employees, including Plaintiff, were subject to a Collective Bargaining Agreement that required arbitration in Rome, Italy. The owner of the vessel is an Italian corporation whose offices are in Genoa, Italy. Defendant is incorporated under the laws of Antigua. In sum, the Court finds that after nearly a year of discovery
*919
directed specifically at the jurisdictional issue, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to show that the contacts between Defendant and the United States were substantial enough to create federal jurisdiction over this action.
20
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss (DE #32, filed September3, 1997) be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
This case is CLOSED. All pending motions not otherwise ruled upon are DENIED AS MOOT.
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Harley Amanquiton v. Jonny Peterson, 813 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…infers that there must have been other visits over a period of years during which Peterson did business with Tecma-rine that might amount to substantial contact, he has provided no evidence of such contacts. See Baydar v. Renaissance Cruises, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 916, 917 (S.D.Fla.1999)(recognizing that burden is on party asserting jurisdiction to show that court does, in fact, have jurisdiction). The lack of evidence of substantial contacts also distinguishes this case from Rojas v. Kloster Cruise, A/S, 550 So…1 / 2
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Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (S.D. Fla. 2002)…ears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction. Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953, 101 S.Ct. 358, 66 L.Ed.2d 217(1980); Baydar v. Renaissance Cruises, Inc., 35 F.Supp.2d 916, 917 (S.D.Fla.1999). In evaluating whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, a court must accept all the complaint’s well-pled factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 2…
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Williams v. Cruise Ships Catering & Serv. Int'l, N.V., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Fla. 2003)…during the year 2000. [I'd]. During one of its stops, the Plaintiff was treated by a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale for the injuries in question. [Klutz Affidavit ¶ 20]. This contact distinguishes this case from Baydar v. Renaissance Cruises, Inc., 35 F.Supp.2d 916 (S.D.Fla.1999), in which the Court granted dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. In Baydar, this Court determined that the eighth factor did not warrant Jones Act jurisdiction partly because there were no United States ports involve…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (U.S. 1953)
- Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (U.S. 1970)
- Tomas Menchaca and wife v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1980)
- Luis E. Garcia, M.D. v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D.'S, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1997)
- Fisher v. The Agios Nicolaos V, 628 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1980)
- Anastasia Sigalas v. Lido Mar., Inc., 776 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1985)
- Ryszard Szumlicz v. Norwegian Am. Line, Inc., 698 F.2d 1192 (11th Cir. 1983)
- Menchaca et ux. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 449 U.S. 953 (U.S. 1980)
- Slugocki v. US, 988 F. Supp. 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1997)