GAETA
v.
SEASIDE MANOR
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Marie A. Gaeta, individually and as personal representative of her deceased husband's estate, appeals an order compelling arbitration of tort claims against an assisted living facility. Gaeta challenges the enforceability of an arbitration agreement's limitation of liability provision, arguing it violates Florida public policy and is not severable. The court agrees and reverses the trial court's order.
The limitation of liability provision in the arbitration agreement is unenforceable and not severable under Florida public policy as established in Gessa, Shotts, and Reinshagen. No valid delegation provision exists in the agreement that would require the arbitrator to make determinations regarding the enforceability of challenged provisions.
[1] An arbitration agreement provision that limits liability in an assisted living facility context violates Florida public policy and cannot be severed from the agreement to…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGaeta's husband was admitted to Appellees' assisted living facility, and Gaeta signed an arbitration agreement on his behalf. The agreement contained …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Marie A. Gaeta, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Anthony J. Gaeta, appeals the trial court’s non-final order compelling arbitration of her tort claims against Appellees. Appellant’s husband was admitted to Appellees’ assisted living facility, at which time Appellant signed, on behalf of her husband, an agreement to arbitrate any disputes between the parties (the “Agreement”). Appellant argues that numerous provisions of the Agreement, including a limitation of liability provision, are unenforceable because they violate Florida’s public policy, and that those provisions cannot be severed, citing Gessa v. Manor Care of Florida, Inc., 86 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 2011), Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., 86 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2011), and Estate of Reinshagen ex rel. Reinshagen v. WRYP ALF, LLC, 190 So. 3d 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).
We agree.1 In light of this binding case law, Appellees make no attempt to argue that any of the challenged provisions are consistent with public policy or even that they are severable. Rather, Appellees’ primary argument is that the arbitrator, not the court, must make those determinations because the Agreement contains a delegation provision.
However, after a thorough review of the record, we do not find a delegation provision in the Agreement. Thus, we agree with Appellant that Gessa, Shotts, and Reinshagen compel a conclusion here that the limitation of liability provision in the Agreement is both unenforceable and not severable.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
PALMER, WALLIS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur. 1 Appellant also challenges the validity of other provisions of the Agreement which may be against public policy, but we need not reach those issues in light of the controlling precedent of Gessa, Shotts, and Reinshagen.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., 86 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2011)
- Gessa v. Manor Care OF Fla., Inc., 86 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 2011)
- Est. OF Robert F. Reinshagen v. Wryp ALF, LLC, 190 So. 3d 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)