STANLEY

v.

UNITED STATES

GONZALEZ, District Judge.

I

THIS CAUSE has come before the court for review

sua sponte

upon the issuance of the Supreme Court’s opinion in

Chappell v. Wallace,

— U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), and upon counsel for the plaintiff’s letter to the court and the plaintiff’s response to the previously filed motions to dismiss. In light of all of the foregoing, the court finds it necessary to clarify its prior opinion denying in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss,

Stanley v. United States, et al. (Stanley II),

549 F.Supp. 327 (S.D.Fla.1982), and the applica

*476

tion of the Supreme Court’s opinion in

Chappell

to that decision.

This case involves the secret administration of LSD to the plaintiff, a member of the United States Army, as part of an Army experiment.

In 1958, the plaintiff James Stanley was a Master Sergeant in the United States Army stationed in Fort Knox, Kentucky. Stanley volunteered to participate in a program at the Chemical Warfare Laboratories at the Army Chemical Center, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland. The purpose of the program allegedly was the development and testing of methods of defense against chemical warfare attack, including the testing of various gas masks and protective clothing.

During interviews with military and civilian personnel at Edgewood Arsenal, Stanley was asked to drink a clear liquid which, unknown to him, contained lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).

1

Stanley alleges that he suffered severe reactions, including hallucinations, as a result of ingesting the LSD. When he returned to active duty at Fort Knox a month later, he maintains that he was in an altered behavioral and emotional state.

2

Stanley continued to serve his country in the Army for eleven years, all the while completely unaware of the wrong knowingly perpetrated against him. In 1969, the Army discharged Mr. Stanley without informing him that he had ingested LSD years earlier. In December 1975, Stanley received a letter from the Department of the Army, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, soliciting his participation in a followup study of the subjects of the 1958 LSD experiments. Only then did Mr. Stanley learn that the Army had secretly administered LSD to him in 1958.

The original complaint in this case consisted of claims brought against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or the “Act”), Pub.L. No. 601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of²⁸ U.S.C.).

3

The question of this court’s jurisdiction over those claims was first raised on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. This court granted the motion for summary judgment on the basis of the doctrine announced in

Feres v. United States,

340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950). The

Feres

doctrine provides that “the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.”

Id.

at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159.

Upon review of that ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that this court’s application of the

Feres

doctrine to preclude the claims brought in the original complaint was correct, but that this court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment.

Stanley v. CIA (Stanley I),

639 F. 2d 1146 (1981). Rather, the Fifth Circuit held, the proper disposition of the case was dismissal

*477

of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals then remanded the case for the trial court’s consideration of any amendment that the plaintiff might offer to cure the jurisdictional defect.

The plaintiff then amended his complaint

4

and, in addition to the original allegations that the defendants gave him false information regarding the program in which he participated, he also alleged that the defendants were grossly negligent in failing to debrief and inform him of the 1958 episode upon his discharge, and in failing to continue to monitor his condition subsequent to his discharge. The plaintiff seeks damages for this allegedly negligent conduct.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing,

inter alia,

that the Fifth Circuit’s opinion precluded the plaintiff from alleging any claim under the FTCA and that the plaintiff could not maintain any cause of action pursuant to

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), because any such claim would also be barred by the FTCA, did not rise to constitutional magnitude, or would be precluded by the applicable statute of limitations.

Heeding the opinion of the Fifth Circuit in

Stanley I,

this court decided that the plaintiff could not plead a statutory (i.e. FTCA) or Bivens-type claim against the Government itself. But this court did hold that Mr. Stanley had a viable

Bivens

action against individual agents and officers of the United States who participated in the LSD experiment.

Stanley II,

549 F.Supp. at 329-32.

5

It is this last conclusion that the court finds necessary to reaffirm at this time.

In concluding that the plaintiff has a viable cause of action based on

Bivens

against the individual defendants, the court rejected the defendants’ argument that any

Bivens

claim also was barred by the

Feres

doctrine.

Id.

at 330. The court cited the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in

Wallace v. Chappell,

661 F. 2d 729 (9th Cir.1981), in support of its theory that although a claim against the government under the FTCA may be barred by the

Feres

doctrine, a

Bivens

cause of action arising from the same set of facts, against individuals, is not necessarily barred by

Feres.

The Supreme Court now having reversed the Ninth Circuit in

Chappell v. Wallace,

— U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), it has been suggested that the plaintiff no longer has a viable cause of action based on

Bivens.

The task before this court is to decide if

Chappell

is controlling in the instant case, and whether the exceptions to a

Bivens

action preclude the plaintiff’s claims against federal officers.

II

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), established that the victim of a constitutional violation by a federal officer has the right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right; the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars a similar action against the United States itself.

Stanley II,

549 F.Supp. at-330 (relying on

*478

Jaffee v. United States,

592 F. 2d 712 (3d Cir.1979),

cert. denied,

441 U.S. 961, 99 S.Ct. 2406, 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979)).

6

The

Bivens

cause of action may be defeated in a particular case, however, in two situations. The first is when defendants demonstrate “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”

Bivens,

403 U.S. at 396, 91 5. Ct. at 2004;

see Carlson v. Green,

446 U.S.¹⁴,18, 100 S.Ct. 1468,1471, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980);

Garcia v. United States,

666 F. 2d 960, 965 (5th Cir.1982). The second is when defendants prove that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective.

Bivens,

403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005;

see Carlson,

446 U.S. at 18, 100 S.Ct. at 1471;

Garcia,

666 F. 2d at 965.

The

Bivens

action arose out of the need to deter federal officers from violating a citizen’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court recognized that absent a constitutional remedy, complainants would have no other form of judicial relief from federal abuses. Creation of the

Bivens

action was consistent with the traditional view that “damages ... [be] recognized as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.”

Bivens,

403 U.S. at 395, 91 S.Ct. at 2004.

In

Chappell v. Wallace,

the Supreme Court reviewed the propriety of a

Bivens

action arising out of an intramilitary dispute. The Court held that “the unique disciplinary structure of the military establishment and Congress’ activity in the [military] field constitute ‘special factors’ which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a

Bi

vens-type remedy against their superior officers.” — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. at 2367.

This court strongly believes that the

Chappell

decision has no effect whatsoever on the plaintiff’s ability to maintain a cause of action arising from the facts of the instant case. Although the court relied on

Wallace v. Chappell,

661 F. 2d 729 (9th Cir.1981), to support the reasoning in its prior ruling that Mr. Stanley has a valid

Bivens

claim, the plaintiff’s cause of action is in no way dependent upon that opinion, nor is his claim precluded by the Supreme Court’s reversal of that decision. The court finds that the facts of this case are distinguishable from

Chappell,

and although the Supreme Court has now substantially limited the availability of a

Bivens

action in cases to which the

Feres

doctrine may be applicable, the Court has not totally barred

Bivens

actions by servicemen for torts committed against them during their term of service.

Ill

In

Chappell v. Wallace,

— U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), five enlisted men serving aboard a combat naval vessel brought a

Bivens

action against their commanding officer and various other superior officers. The complaint alleged that because of their minority race, the defendants failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and imposed penalties of unusual severity. For these transgressions, the plaintiffs sought damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, holding that the actions complained of were nonreviewable military decisions, that the naval officers were entitled to immunity, and that the enlisted men had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the naval practices complained of were reviewable, and that the officers in question enjoyed only qualified immunity from suit.

Wallace v. Chappell,

661 F. 2d 729 (9th

*479

Cir.1981). The court of appeals concluded that the

Feres

doctrine does not bar a

Bivens

action and, therefore, enlisted men could bring a constitutional claim against the naval officers involved.

Id.

at 735-36 & n. 9.

The Supreme Court of the United States sided with the district court and reversed the appellate court’s decision. The Court found that the

Feres

doctrine’s underlying policy of protecting military discipline constituted a “special factor” that precluded a

Bivens

action. — U.S. at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2367. In a sweeping concluding statement, the Court held that “enlisted military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior for alleged constitutional violations.”

Id.

at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2368. Significantly, however, the Chief Justice limited the scope of the Court’s decision, declaring that “[t]his Court has never held,

nor do we now hold,

that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service.”

Id.

at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2367 (emphasis added).

The obvious import of the Court’s qualified holding is to limit the

Chappell

decision to its facts. Because the Supreme Court explicitly refrained from precluding all civil actions by military personnel for constitutional wrongs committed during their service, and because the Court found it necessary to determine whether there were special factors present in the facts of

Chappell

which militated against finding a

Bivens

cause of action, this court concludes that the Supreme Court’s blanket statement stripping military personnel of their right to maintain an action against superior officers bars only those actions in which the- same “special factors” are present, i.e., a case in which a member of the military brings a suit against a superior officer for wrongs which involve direct orders in the performance of military duty and the discipline and order necessary thereto.

A

The first exception to a

Bivens

action is the existence of “special factors counsel-ling hesitation.” The

Chappell

Court considered the need for military discipline to be just such a “special factor.” Traditionally, courts have not interferred with intramilitary disputes because they lack the requisite competency and because such intermeddling would threaten the legitimacy of military orders. — U.S. at —-—, 103 S.Ct. at 2365-67. The Supreme Court noted the “peculiar and special relationship” of the soldier to his superiors and observed that the rights of military personnel must give way to the overriding demands of discipline and duty.

Id.

at-, 103 S.Ct. at 2365. The Court explained that this is not only true in a combat situation, but also true in the training that precedes combat, so that immediate obedience to military procedures and orders can become so ingrained that it becomes reflexive.

Id.

Thus, it comes as no surprise that the

Chappell

Court refused to allow the enlisted men to recover damages from their superior officers for alleged constitutional violations, because the acts complained of occurred during the course and performance of the plaintiffs’ duties as military personnel.

This court is well aware of the compelling need to protect military discipline in order to ensure the execution of military orders. However, the plaintiff’s

Bivens

action in the instant case neither involves nor threatens to compromise military discipline. The case does not involve a combat or combat-training situation; it does not involve any exigent circumstances; and it is not a case in which the plaintiff was either ordered or obligated to participate in a military exercise. Rather, this is a case in which the Army sought volunteers to test equipment, and the plaintiff volunteered his participation, in service to his country.

7

*480

Had civilians been eligible to participate in the program, this case could easily have involved a person not a member of the military. In sum, applying the

Chappell

Court’s own standard, this is not a case involving “[t]he special nature of military life, [or] the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel ....” — U.S. at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2367.

The factual posture of the instant case clearly distinguishes it from several other appellate decisions which have reached a different result. The two most notable are

Gaspard v. United States,

544 F.Supp. 55 (E.D.La.1982),

aff&#x²⁷;d,

713 F. 2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983), and

Jaffee v. United States,

663 F. 2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981).

8

Gaspard

and

Jaffee

are basically identical in factual design and result. In both cases, former servicemen and their wives sued the United States and various named and unnamed federal officers for violating their constitutional rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that during the Army’s atomic testing in the 1950’s, their superior officers knowingly

ordered

them to purposely expose themselves to atomic fallout.

9

Years later, the plaintiffs suffered a host of medical maladies, most of which they attributed to the in-service radiation exposures. The plaintiffs’

Bivens

claims soon followed.

Both the Fifth and Third Circuits dismissed the

Bivens

actions, holding that money damages may not be assessed against the military or its officers if the suit jeopardized military discipline and if there existed an exclusive statutory remedy. Essentially, the courts found that under the specific facts alleged, the rationale of the

Feres

doctrine barred the

Bivens

claims.

10

The result in

Gaspard

and

Jaffee

is understandable because the soldiers there “were on active duty status at the time of

*481

[the atomic testing], in uniform,

and subject to military orders and discipline." Gaspard,

713 F. 2d at 1099 (emphasis added).

11

Significantly, however, the plaintiff in the instant case did not participate in the Army’s testing program because a superior officer ordered him to do so; instead — to reiterate — he volunteered. Unlike the soldiers in

Gaspard

and

Jaffe,

who could have left the atomic testing site only upon penalty of insubordination, Mr. Stanley could have freely withdrawn from the Army’s LSD experiments. In no way, then, does the instant ease require the court to inquire into the propriety of military orders. Therefore, the single most compelling reason for extending the

Feres

doctrine to

Bivens

claims against military officers, and the basis for the

Chappell

decision, is not controlling in the case at bar. Even if military discipline was somehow tangentially affected by this court’s decision, there exists ample common-law and statutory authority to support judicial review of the plaintiff Stanley’s constitutional claim. First, complaints by military personnel, which are encouraged by the Uniform Code of Military Justice,¹⁰ U.S.C.A. § 938 (1975),

12

are judicially reviewable.

13

Second, military officials have traditionally been held accountable in courts of law,

14

and this practice continues today.

15

Third,

*482

military officers are subject to only qualified immunity,

16

albeit this immunity is granted if military discipline would be deleteriously affected by judicial interference.

See Chappell,

— U.S. at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2365-66.

In conclusion, by donning a uniform, a member of the Army does not volunteer himself to be duped and deceived into becoming a guinea pig for his superiors, and consequently to be deprived of his most fundamental constitutional and human rights. The “peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors” does not permit the violation of those fundamental rights in a situation that does not involve military discipline and duty. Furthermore, although the special status of the military has required the establishment of two systems of justice, one for civilians and the other for military personnel, both must operate within the confines of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. As explained in

Thornwell v. United States,

471 F.Supp. 344 (D.D.C.1979), a case almost identical to the one at bar:

17

To hold that the military may deprive a civilian of his constitutional rights merely because the deprivation originated when the civilian was an enlisted man would be tantamount to declaring all veterans second class citizens. Men and women who have served in our Armed Forces, and to whom this nation is indebted beyond measurement, are certainly entitled to the constitutional liberties afforded all citizens. In short, if the military deprives a veteran of his constitutional rights, it may not look to

Feres

for immunity.

Id.

at 353 (footnote omitted).

B

The

Chappell

Court, by its own admission,

18

relies on the

Feres

doctrine policy of protecting military discipline to bar a

Bivens

action. Although a small portion of the opinion intimates that the Court is sensitive to the difference between a statutory and a constitutional cause of action,

19

the decision’s overall analysis appears to belie this view. Statutory and constitutional actions implicate different immunity concepts, which can sharply alter the complexion of a court’s analysis. A

Bivens

claim raises questions about official immunity, while the principle of sovereign immunity often dictates the result of actions brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. This court does not interpret

Chappell

as holding that the law and policy circumscribing statutory actions are controlling herein. Rather, the FTCA, and more specifically the

Feres

doctrine, merely influence this court’s analysis of plaintiff’s constitutional claim. To ensure that its position on this important point is clear, the court pauses at this juncture to examine the relationship

*483

between the

Feres

doctrine and the

Bivens

cause of action.

The

Feres

doctrine represents a judicial response to Congress’ passage of the FTCA. The doctrine prevents members of the armed forces from suing the United States for injuries suffered incident to, or arising out of, military service. There

Feres

Court cited several reasons for the doctrine, some of which remain persuasive today. First, the “distinctively federal” nature of the relationship between soldiers and the government means that military personnel should not be subject to variations in state law when seeking relief.

20

Second, claims against the government are unnecessary because there already exists a comprehensive system for compensating military personnel under the Veterans Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1976).

21

Third, suits against the government are barred because of the need for military discipline, which is fostered by preventing a soldier from questioning the legitimacy and propriety of an order.²²

Completely distinguishable from a statutory action against the military barred by

Feres

is a constitutional cause of action based on

Bivens.

The source of a

Bivens

action is the Constitution; the rights protected therein are among the most valued personal liberties that citizens possess. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long recognized that a citizen has a right to relief when his constitutional rights are violated. As Chief Justice John Marshall observed in

Marbury v. Madison,

Bivens

Court logically extended this principle to include a citizen’s right to sue federal officers for alleged violations of the former’s constitutional rights. 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005. The federal courts have the power to award damages to a litigant in a

Bivens

claim absent congressional authorization,

23

and such actions can be implied under the Fifth Amendment.

24

*484

In

Carlson v. Green,

446 U.S.¹⁴, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), which involved a claim by a mother on behalf of her deceased son against federal prison officials who were alleged to have intentionally deprived him of necessary medical care, the Supreme Court recognized another important difference between the

Bivens

and FTCA actions: the constitutional remedy is more effective. The Court adduced four reasons for this conclusion:

First, the

Bivens

remedy, in addition to compensating victims, serves a deterrent purpose. Because the

Bivens

remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against the United States.

Second, our decisions ... indicate that punitive damages may be awarded in a

Bivens

suit____ But punitive damages in an FTCA suit are statutorily prohibited.²⁸ U.S.C. § 2674. Thus FTCA is that much less effective than a

Bivens

action as a deterrent to unconstitutional acts.

Third, a, plaintiff cannot opt for a jury in an FTCA action,²⁸ U.S.C. § 2402, as he may in a

Bivens

suit....

Fourth, an action under FTCA exists only if the state in which the alleged misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct to go forward.²⁸ U.S.C. § 1346(b). Yet it is obvious that the liability of federal officials for violations of citizen’s constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules.

Carlson,

446 U.S. at 21-23, 100 S.Ct. at 1472-74. Rather than allow federal officials to act beyond the scope of their authority with impunity, the

Bivens

action checks the exercise of that power and serves as “an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees.”

Butz v. Economou,

438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2910, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978).

25

Because of these differences, the

Bivens

and FTCA actions are distinguishable.

Extending the

Feres

analysis to a

Bivens

claim blurs the distinction between statutory and constitutional actions. Without delineating between the two, a court might grant

official

immunity to officers in the military based on reasoning that heretofore has sustained only federal

sovereign

immunity. While sovereign immunity has constitutional underpinnings and is as absolute as Congress may intend, official immunity is judge-made and generally is qualified.

26

*485

In order to avoid obscuring the concepts of sovereign and official immunity,

Chappell

counsels that the

Feres

doctrine “guides,” but does not dictate, the outcome of a

Bivens

action arising out of an intramilitary dispute. The Court reasons that if the

Feres

doctrine applies, then military officers may be subject to qualified immunity from suit. As explained above, however, the

Feres

doctrine is not controlling in the instant case because the discipline of military subordinates is in no way implicated by the facts. Thus, in holding that the plaintiffs

Bivens

action is viable, this court is faithful to the rule in

Chappell

while remaining sensitive to the distinction between a statutory and a constitutional cause of action.

C

Under the

Bivens

analysis, the implication of a constitutional cause of action also may be precluded when Congress has explicitly provided an adequate alternative remedy. The

Chappell

Court devotes little space to this issue; in fact, nowhere in the opinion does the Court even mention this second exception to a

Bivens

action. The Court does point out, however, that military personnel can bring their complaints before a military tribunal, and that such bodies can award retroactive back pay and promotions.

Chappell,

— U.S. at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2367.

Such remedies are meaningless in the instant case. The constitutional wrong complained of by Mr. Stanley is impossible to correct. The plaintiff does not claim that the Army cheated him out of either money or a promotion. Rather, he alleges that the Army has knowingly deprived him of the ability to appreciate and enjoy his life; that for the past twenty-five years, he has suffered — and continues to suffer— from serious mental illness and severe physical pain. Amended Complaint MI⁵, 8 (filed Apr.²⁹, 1981).

Having differentiated between the alternative remedies available in

Chappell

and the instant case, the court would be content to stop here. However, the need for clarity in this case compels the court to explain in greater detail why no alternative remedies exist that would preclude the plaintiffs

Bivens

action.

There are two, mutually dependent, elements to the alternative remedy exception. The first element requires proof that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it

explicitly

declared to be a substitute for recovery under the Constitution.

Bivens,

403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005;

see Carlson v. Green,

446 U.S.¹⁴, 19-20, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1472, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980);

Davis v. Passman,

442 U.S. 228, 246-47, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2278, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979). An essential aspect of this element is that Congress must expressly intend for the alternative remedy to replace, rather than to complement, the

Bivens

remedy.

Carlson,

446 U.S. at 19 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 1472 n. 5. The second independent requirement for this exception to apply is that the remedial scheme must be

equally as effective

as the damages action.

Id.

at 18-19, 100 S.Ct. at 1471-72.

The only alternative remedy that satisfies the first element of the exception is the Veterans Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1976) (“VBA”). Although the Third and Fifth Circuits have concluded that the VBA preempts a private action against the military for damages based on the Constitution,

see Gaspard v. United States,

713 F. 2d 1097 (5th Cir.1983);

Jaffee v. United States,

663 F. 2d 1226, 1245-46 (3d Cir.1981), neither of these decisions applied the

Bivens/Carlson

analysis.

The

Jaffee

court fundamentally modified the alternative remedy test by not requiring “an explicit Congressional declaration of the exclusivity of veterans’ compensation.” 663 F. 2d at 1243. In

Gaspard,

the court ignored the

Bivens/Carlson

stan

*486

dard altogether. While the Fifth Circuit found the VBA to be an “exclusive” and “comprehensive” remedy, 713 F. 2d at 1102, 1105, no consideration was given, as

Carlson

requires, to whether the statutory claim is “as effective” a remedy as the

Bivens

action itself. Moreover, the

Gaspard

court did not find, as

Bivens

requires, that Congress had “explicitly declared” the VBA to be an exclusive remedy.

27

This court is not prepared to alter so radically the standard established in

Bivens

and reaffirmed in

Carlson,

especially since the

Chappell

Court was presented with the issue and basically elected to ignore it.

28

Admittedly, the legislative history of the VBA indicates that Congress has assumed some responsibility for insuring adequate compensation for service-related injuries, S.Rep. No. 94-1226, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.¹⁰,

reprinted in

1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2537, 2541. Yet nowhere in the legislative history or the statutory language of the VBA itself does the Congress “explicitly declare” that the VBA is to replace a money damages action.

29

This is particularly significant because Congress follows the practice of expressly stating when it intends to make a legislative remedy exclusive.

See

10 U.S.C.A. § 1089(a) (1983); 38 U.S.C.A. § 4116(a) (1979); 42 U.S.C.A. § 233(a) (1982); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2458a (West Supp.1983).

30

None of the decisions which have found the VBA to be an exclusive remedy for servicemen seeking compensation for injuries sustained while in the military have reconciled their result with this congressional practice.

See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States,

444 U.S. 460, 464, 100 S.Ct. 647, 650, 62 L.Ed.2d 614 (1980) (relying on

Stencel Aero Engineering Co. v. United States,

431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977));

Gaspard v. United States,

713 F. 2d 1097 (5th Cir.1983);

Scales v. United States,

685 F. 2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982),

cert. denied,

— U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 1772, 76 L.Ed.2d 344 (1983);

Jaffee v. United States,

663 F. 2d 1226 (3d Cir.1981);

Carter v. City of Cheyenne,

649 F. 2d 827 (10th Cir.1981).

But see supra

note 21. Furthermore, cases such as

Stencel, Scales,

and

Carter

are distinguishable

*487

from the instant case because they involved statutory actions against the Government, and not constitutional actions against federal officers.

In a statutory claim against the Government, the legislature has created the action and, appropriately enough, delineates the available remedies. The remedies are declared exclusive as the necessary tradeoff for making the sovereign liable for wrongdoing. Thus, an injured serviceman suing the Government under the FTCA is assured a “swift, efficient remedy,” and the Government itself basically remains protected from unlimited liability by the Act’s limitation-of-liability provisions.

Stencel,

431 U.S. at 673, 97 S.Ct. at 2058 (quoting

Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, Inc.,

417 U.S. 106, 115, 94 S.Ct. 2174, 2179, 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974)).

Legislative relief is neither an exclusive nor an adequate means of compensating a person whose constitutional rights were violated by federal officers. To begin with, a

Bivens

action does not threaten to expose the Government to broad liability because a federal officer, and not the Government, is the party charged with wrongdoing. Additionally, the

Bivens

cause of action seeks to hold a federal officer accountable for his actions,

supra

pp. 483-484, while the statutory action in

Stencel

and similar cases is designed to insure “simple, certain, and uniform compensation.”

Jaffee v. United States,

663 F. 2d 1226, 1232 (3d Cir.1981) (interpreting the VBA and quoting from

Feres).

In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that the VBA is nothing more than a no-fault compensation scheme that substitutes for tort liability.

Stencel,

431 U.S. at 672, 97 S.Ct. at 2058;

see Lombard v. United States,

690 F. 2d 215, 219 (D.C.Cir.1982). In short, the VBA should be viewed as fully adequate only in combination with the

Bivens

remedy.

Other reasons suggest that the VBA does not pass judicial scrutiny under the

Bivens/Carlson

standard. Initially, even after passage of the VBA, money damages could still be recovered under state tort law for intentional and negligent torts. If the VBA was to be meant as an exclusive remedy, then why did not Congress close this legal loophole? Furthermore, given the plethora of suits involving servicemen seeking judicial review of their intramilitary disputes,

31

why has Congress neither clarified the status of nor expressly barred money damages claims when confronted with this issue?

32

Even if the VBA is deemed to be an alternative remedy which Congress has explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery under the Constitution, this court finds that it is not “an

equally

effective remedial scheme.”

Carlson,

446 U.S. at 22 n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1468 n. 10. An alternative remedy, to be equally effective in this case, must accomplish two objectives: it must make the complainant whole and deter future such abuses of power.³³

The court remains uncertain whether the Veterans Administration’s (VA) system of benefits is

*488

equipped to satisfy the plaintiff’s demand for relief. Additionally, shifting the responsibility for compensating Mr. Stanley from the federal officers involved to the VA has little deterrent value to the individuals, and all but declares that military officers can violate the most basic of our constitutional rights with impunity.

IV

After lengthy analysis, the court concludes that the Supreme Court’s decision in

Chappell v. Wallace,

— U.S. —, 103. S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), is inapposite, and that the plaintiff has a viable Bivens-type cause of action against individual agents and officers of the United States who participated in the LSD experiments.

By way of review, the overbroad statements in

Chappell

must be read in the context of the facts and analysis of the opinion. A careful examination of

Chappell

proves that, at most, the Supreme Court has decided to bar

Bivens

actions brought by servicemen against their superiors if the alleged wrongdoing occurred during active duty and was incident to the execution of military orders. Couched in these terms, the holding in the case at bar displays the proper deference to

Chappell,

yet preserves the sworn duty of this court to be heard when the Government’s egregious behavior violates the law by victimizing the very people that it asks to defend it.

Constitutional law scholar Archibald Cox has written that for the law to have true authority and precedential value, it must “meet the needs of men and match their ethical sensibilities.” A. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 110 (1976). As has been demonstrated, any decision by this court strictly and literally applying the holding of

Chappell

to the instant case, of necessity, would crumble under the weight of legal and moral scrutiny. This court has seen few cases which more desperately cry out for and demand judicial redress. The acts alleged to have been committed by the officers and agents named as defendants in this case are insidious to the most fundamental rights protected by our Constitution: the right of an individual to control his mind, his private thoughts, and his bodily integrity. To deny Mr. Stanley a judicial forum is to strip the court of its most important function — to ensure that the plaintiff is accorded justice under the law.

This court reiterates the words of Chief Justice Earl Warren, as quoted in the

Chappell

decision: “ ‘our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.’ ” — U.S. at —, 103 S.Ct. at 2367 (citing Warren,

The Bill of Rights and the Military,

37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 181, 188 (1962)). Accordingly, this court, having found that the special factors existing in

Chappell

are not applicable to this case, and that no special factors exist dictating against a Bivens-type action, refuses to conclude that the

Chappell

decision precludes a

Bivens

-type cause of action by the plaintiff Stanley.

The prior order herein denying in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby ratified and confirmed.