ATTAWAY TILLMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
HENRY DANIEL MCLEOD, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1960-10-19
No. 1741
ALLEN, C. J., and SAULS, RICHARD, Associate Judge, concur.
124 So. 2d 135 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1960) Positive Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

The appellate court reviewed a summary judgment that held the plaintiff was a guest under the Florida Guest Statute, requiring proof of gross negligence for his injuries sustained during transportation.


Holding

The lower court correctly held that the plaintiff was a guest under the Florida Guest Statute, meaning the plaintiff must prove gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct to recover damages.


Facts & Procedural History

The plaintiff was injured while being driven by the defendant to see a lender for a remodeling job. The plaintiff argued he was not a guest and only n…

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Opinion of the Court
SHANNON, Judge.

SHANNON, Judge.

The appellant, plaintiff below, has appealed from a summary judgment entered against him in a tort action below. The plaintiff was engaged in operating a store and renting apartments. The defendant was a carpenter and contractor and was, at the time of the accident, interested in *136doing work on a remodeling job for Tillman. Tillman had been unsuccessful in getting a loan and on the day in question McLeod, driving his own automobile, picked up Tillman and was driving him to see another lender, who McLeod had recommended, when the McLeod car collided with a car driven by a third party. Tillman was injured and brought the suit.

The question to be decided was whether or not Tillman was a guest. He took the position in the lower court that he was not a guest and that it was necessary for him only to prove simple negligence. On the other hand, the defendant maintained that he was a guest and that it was necessary for Tillman to prove that McLeod was guilty of gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct. The lower court held that Tillman was a guest under the Florida Guest Statute and entered a summary judgment against him. Under 320.59, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., the pertinent section of the Guest Statute reads as follows:

“No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest or passenger, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such motor vehicle, and unless such gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct was the proximate cause of the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought; * ' *

The definition of “guest” under this or similar statutes has been the subject of a great deal of litigation and legal writing. In 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, § 2292, the author states:

“One important element in determining whether a person is a guest within the meaning and limitations of such statutes is the identity of the person or persons advantaged by the carriage. If, in its direct operation, it confers a benefit only on the person to whom the ride is given, and no benefits, other than such as are incident to hospitality, companionship, or the like, upon the person extending the invitation, the passenger is a guest within the statutes; but, if his carriage tends to the promotion of mutual interests of both himself and the driver and operates for their common benefit or if it is primarily for the attainment of some objective or purpose of the operator, he is not a guest within the meaning of such enactments. * * * ”

Of like import is the section on Automobiles and Highway Traffic, 5A Am.Jur., § 514, where it is said:

“A guest is one who is invited, either directly or by implication, to enjoy the hospitality of the driver, and who accepts such hospitality and takes a ride either for his own pleasure or on his own business, without making any return to or conferring any benefit upon the driver other than the mere pleasure of his company. A person riding in a motor vehicle is a guest if his carriage confers a benefit only upon himself and no benefit upon the owner or operator except such as is incidental to hospitality, social relations, companionship, or the like as a mere gratuity. However, if his carriage contributes such tangible ' and substantial benefits as to promote the mutual interest of both the passenger and the owner or operator, or is primarily for the attainment of some tangible and substantial objective or business purpose of the owner or operator, he is not a guest. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

The mutual benefit rule under the Guest Statute is well established in Florida. This is a doctrine which provides that one *137who is a passenger for the mutual benefit of himself and the owner or operator of the vehicle is not a guest under the statute. See Montana v. Gorp, Fla.App.1959, 108 So.2d 64; and Sproule v. Nelson, Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 478. In applying this rule each case must be governed by its own facts, but several of the Florida cases provide interesting guide posts as to what constitutes a mutual benefit.

This court, in Sullivan v. Stock, Fla.App. 1957, 98 So.2d 507, 510, decided the question on a fact situation quite similar to the present one. Judge Kanner, in writing the opinion for the Court, said:

“So it is the guest statute does not apply when the transportation is solely for the benefit of the owner or operator or mutual benefit of the passenger and the owner or operator of the car; nor can the guest statute be invoked in commercial transactions * * *.
“In the instant case the mission was to procure a loan of money for appel-lee. Thus the journey, made at the request of appellee, was not simply for a ride but was incidental to the main purpose, that of procuring a loan for the appellee. The loan was effectuated through the valuable aid of the appellant, who recommended it and guaranteed payment, and was for the sole and material benefit of appellee.”'

While the facts in the Sullivan case differed a little from those in the present case, the legal principle involved is identical, and therefore in following the Sullivan case, we must reverse.

Reversed.

ALLEN, C. J., and SAULS, RICHARD, Associate Judge, concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Bramble v. Garris, 144 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
    …e a loan for the owner; the passenger was to guarantee payment. The relationship of owner and guest was asserted not to exist. The case reviewed in some detail the authorities bearing upon the host-guest dilemma. In Tillman v. McLeod, Fla.App.1960, 124 So. 2d 135, plaintiff-passenger was found not to be a guest of defendant-driver in a suit arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff was a property owner who had [*328] been unable to obtain a loan, and defendant, a contractor, was escorting plaintiff to…
  • England v. Stauffer, 145 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
    ….L.R.2d 1066; Sullivan v. Stock, Fla.App.1957, 98 So. 2d 507; Miller v. Morse Auto Rentals, Fla.App.1958, 106 So. 2d 204; Montana v. Gorp, Fla.App.1959, 108 So. 2d 64; Berne v. Peterson, Fla.App.1959, 113 So. 2d 718; Tillman v. McLeod, Fla.App.1960, 124 So. 2d 135. The problem presented is whether there was a mutual benefit between plaintiff and the defendants sufficiently real and [*547] tangible to implement the exception. We agree with the holding of the learned trial judge that there was not. In Peery v…
  • McGOWAN v. Wilson, 154 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
    …eversed and the cause is remanded for the entry of a final judgment in favor of the defendant. Reversed and remanded. . See Sproule v. Nelson, Fla.1955, 81 So. 2d 478; Peery v. Mershon, 149 Fla. 351, 5 So. 2d 694; Tillman v. McLeod, Fla.App. 1960, 124 So. 2d 135; Sullivan v. Stock, Fla.App.1937, 98 So. 2d 507. . See Yokom v. Rodriguez, Fla.1949, 41 So. 2d 446; England v. Stauffer, Fla.App. 1962, 145 So. 2d 545; Master v. Horowitz, 237 App.Div. 237, 261 N.Y.S. 722 (1932).…

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