STATE, EX REL. JANET MCNEE
v.
J. H. LETOURNEAU, ET AL., CONSTITUTING BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, ST. LUCIE INLET DISTRICT & PORT AUTHORITY
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The Florida Supreme Court denied a motion for a peremptory writ, relying on a prior decision that validated a different statute governing port authority commissioners. The court found the current case legally indistinguishable from the prior one in terms of the applicable law.
No, the motion for a peremptory writ should be denied. The legal principles established in a prior, similar case are controlling, and the statute under which the current respondents operate is not the controlling statute.
“The law applicable to this case was enunciated by this Court in the opinion and judgment filed May 11, 1934, in re State of Florida upon relation of Cary D. Landis, Attorney General of the State of Florida, et al., v. J. H. Reardon, et al.”
Establishes the reliance on prior precedent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThis case involved a motion for a peremptory writ against the Board of Commissioners of the St. Lucie Inlet District & Port Authority, operating under…
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This case is before us on motion for peremptory writ, the return notwithstanding.
The law applicable to this case was enunciated by this Court in the opinion and judgment filed May 11, 1934, in re State of Florida upon relation of Cary D. Landis, Attorney General of the State of Florida, et al., v. J. H. Reardon, et al.
The difference between this case and the one above cited is that in this case the respondents were the Board of Commissioners of St. Lucie Inlet District & Port Authority under the provisions of Chapter 13808, Acts of 1929, while the respondents in the other case were the commissioners provided for by provisions of Chapter 16168, Acts of 1933. The latter Act we held to be valid and the .controlling statute.
The motion for peremptory writ notwithstanding the return should be denied on authority of the opinion and judgment above referred to.
It is so ordered.
*176Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
Davis, C. J., and Ellis, J., concur in the opinion and judgment.