HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF KEY WEST, FLORIDA, ETC., APPELLANT,
v.
JOSEPH G. MORETTI, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND SEABOARD SURETY COMPANY, A NEW YORK CORPORATION AUTHORIZED TO TRANSACT BUSINESS AS A SURETY IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEES
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The appellate court affirmed a lower court's judgment, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate entitlement to a directed verdict on liability in a breach of contract case. The court concluded that the defendant presented sufficient evidence to avoid a directed verdict.
No, the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on liability. The plaintiff did not meet the standard required for a directed verdict, as the defendant presented evidence that prevented a peremptory charge in favor of the plaintiff.
“The error assigned is the denial of plaintiff's motion at the conclusion of all the evidence for a directed verdict "as to liability".”
This quote identifies the specific legal error the appellant claimed on appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff, the Housing Authority of the City of Key West, sued for breach of contract and appealed an adverse jury verdict. The plaintiff argued t…
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The plaintiff in an action for breach of contract appealed from a final judgment based upon an adverse jury verdict. The error assigned is the denial of plaintiff’s motion at the conclusion of all the evidence for a directed verdict “as to liability”. A review of those portions of the lengthy record, to which our attention has been directed by the briefs and oral arguments, supports appellees’ contention that the appellant does not bring itself under the rule that when the plaintiff fully makes out a case, and the defendant wholly fails to meet the burden of proof to sustain the defense pleaded, a peremptory charge to find for the plaintiff is proper and should be given if requested. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Huckins, 127 Fla. 540, 173 So. 696; Bland v. Fidelity Trust Co., 71 Fla. 499, 71 So. 630, L.R.A.1916F, 209; Ocala Iron Works v. Crosby, 61 Fla. 369, 54 So. 815.
Affirmed.
PEARSON, Acting Chief Judge, CARROLL, CHAS., J., and MILLEDGE, STANLEY, Associate Judge, concur.
On Petition for Rehearing
The appellant’s petition for rehearing having been examined and considered, and it appearing to a majority of the court that the petition is without merit, and should be denied, it is so ordered.
PEARSON, Acting Chief Judge, and CARROLL, CHAS., J., concur.
MILLEDGE, STANLEY, Associate Judge, dissents.
(dissenting).
I think that the petition for rehearing should be granted. I now agree with the appellant that on the issue of a breach of contract that there was no conflict in the evidence. There was great conflict in the evidence but the conflict was on the question of whether the obvious damage sustained was the result of the breach or the result of another entirely different cause. There being no conflict in the evidence on the issue of breach the plaintiff was entitled at least to nominal damages, which would have carried the costs. Price v. Southern Home Ins. Co. of the Carolinas, 1930, 100 Fla. 338, 129 So. 748. Whether the plaintiff got anything more than nominal damages should depend on how the jury resolved the conflict in evidence on that question above. The whole case was submitted to the jury which re*730turned a general verdict for the defendant so that it is impossible to know whether this was because the jury found that no breach existed or because the plaintiff failed to convince the jury that the damages sustained resulted from the breach. This being the case, I think that the cause should be remanded so that a verdict for plaintiff could be directed and the issue of actual damages submitted to the jury. This case suggests the occasional value of a special verdict. If I were speaking for the court, a special verdict might have saved a long, expensive new trial. The fact that I am not does not detract from the force of my observation.
On Petition for Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
The appellant’s petition for rehearing having been examined and considered, and it appearing to a majority of the court that the petition is without merit, and should be denied, it is so ordered.
PEARSON, Acting Chief Judge, and CARROLL, CHAS., J., concur. MILLEDGE, STANLEY, Associate Judge, dissents.
MILLEDGE, STANLEY, Associate Judge
(dissenting).
I think that the petition for rehearing should be granted. I now agree with the appellant that on the issue of a breach of contract that there was no conflict in the evidence. There was great conflict in the evidence but the conflict was on the question of whether the obvious damage sustained was the result of the breach or the result of another entirely different cause. There being no conflict in the evidence on the issue of breach the plaintiff was entitled at least to nominal damages, which would have carried the costs. Price v. Southern Home Ins. Co. of the Carolinas, 1930, 100 Fla. 338, 129 So.
748. Whether the plaintiff got anything more than nominal damages should depend on how the jury resolved the conflict in evidence on that question above. The whole case was submitted to the jury which re turned a general verdict for the defendant so that it is impossible to know whether this was because the jury found that no breach existed or because the plaintiff failed to convince the jury that the damages sustained resulted from the breach. This being the case, I think that the cause should be remanded so that a verdict for plaintiff could be directed and the issue of actual damages submitted to the jury. This case suggests the occasional value of a special verdict. If I were speaking for the court, a special verdict might have saved a long, expensive new trial. The fact that I am not does not detract from the force of my observation.
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Lloyd v. McKENNA, 179 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)…ese issues to the jury under the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See: Katz v. Bear, Fla.1951, 52 So. 2d 903; Budgen v. Brady, Fla.App. 1958, 103 So. 2d 672; Housing Authority of Key West v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., Fla.App.1960, 119 So. 2d 728. To reverse, as urged by the appellant, would require a holding that a driver of a vehicle is negligent as a matter of law when he has his vehicle under control and traveling within the speed limit with the apparent right of way and enters an unmark…
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Hous. Auth. of the City of Key W. v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 123 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1960)…Certiorari denied without opinion. 119 So. 2d 728.…
Authorities Cited
- Price v. The S. Home Ins. Co. of the Carolinas, 100 Fla. 338 (Fla. 1930)
- New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Alden Huckins, 127 Fla. 540 (Fla. 1937)
- Bland v. Fid. Tr. Co., 71 Fla. 499 (Fla. 1916)
- Ocala Iron Works v. Crosby, 61 Fla. 369 (Fla. 1911)