BRUCE PACKAL, APPELLANT,
v.
DENIZ D. JOHNSON, APPELLEE
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Bruce Packal appeals a permanent injunction for protection against stalking granted by the trial court based on a July 4, 2016 incident with his neighbor Deniz Johnson. The appellate court reverses, holding that the two acts cited by the trial court constitute a single continuous course of conduct insufficient to establish the repeated harassment required for stalking, and that shoving Johnson's boyfriend's son does not constitute harassment of Johnson herself.
The court reversed the injunction, holding that the two acts cited by the trial court (verbal threats while demonstrating a firearm and shoving Garcia) constitute one continuous course of conduct establishing only a single instance of harassment, which cannot support a finding of stalking requiring repeat harassment. Additionally, shoving Garcia does not qualify as harassment of Johnson herself.
[1] A finding of stalking requires competent, substantial evidence of each incident of stalking.
[2] Stalking requires a course of conduct, defined as a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“'Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.”
Establishes the statutory definition of course of conduct necessary to establish stalking; the court used this to find that the two acts within twenty minutes constituted a single continuous course of conduct.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn July 4, 2016, Packal's neighbor Johnson set off fireworks in the street. Startled, Packal emerged from his home with an unloaded gun, made explicit…
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Bruce Packal appeals a judgment granting a permanent injunction for protection against stalking violence.1 Because competent, substantial evidence does not support a finding of stalking, we reverse the injunction.
On the evening of July 4, 2016, Packal’s neighbor, Deniz D. Johnson, set off fireworks with her family in the middle of their street. Startled by the sound of the fireworks, Packal emerged from his home with an unloaded gun, made explicit verbal threats towards Johnson and her family, then crossed the street and shoved Johnson’s boyfriend’s son, Matthew Garcia, who had begun to record the incident on his phone. According to Garcia, the entire confrontation occurred within a twenty-minute timeframe. Johnson subsequently filed a Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Stalking Violence.
Although Johnson alleged a history of confrontations involving Packal, the trial court expressly disregarded this history at the hearing on the petition and focused entirely on the July 4 altercation. The trial court ultimately found that Packal’s actions during, the twenty-minute altercation qualified as two separate incidents of harassment, warranting an injunction. Specifically, the trial court found that Packal harassed Johnson by: (1) verbally threatening her and her family while demonstrating his firearm, and (2) shoving Garcia.
Section 784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2016), establishes a cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking. “Each incident of stalking must be proven by competent, substantial evidence to support an injunction against stalking.” David v. Schack, 192 So.3d 625, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Touhey v. Seda, 133 So.3d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)). “A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat (2016). “’Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” Id. § 784.048(l)(a) (emphasis added). “’Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.” Id. § 784.048(l)(b).
Here, the two acts cited by the trial court amount to one continuous course of conduct, establishing only one instance of harassment. Cf. Levy v. Jacobs, 69 So.3d 403, 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“[T]he record evidence demonstrated that in addition to occurring in different locations, there was a temporal break of approximately five minutes between the incidents. This was a sufficient temporal break to allow [the respondent] time to pause, reflect, and form a new intent before the second attack.”). This single instance cannot support a finding of stalking, which requires evidence of repeat harassment. See § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. Further, even if we find that Packal’s actions constitute two separate instances of harassment, Packal shoving Garcia does not qualify as harassment of Johnson. See id. *339§ 784.048(1)(a).2 Accordingly, we reverse the injunction.
REVERSED.
SAWAYA and TORPY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…n 'repeated acts of following or harassment.' ") (quoting Lukacs , 982 So. 2d at 1219 )). Stated differently, repeated acts are required for "one act of stalking. " Lukacs , 982 So. 2d at 1219 (emphasis in the original); see also Packal v. Johnson , 226 So. 3d 337 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (reversing permanent injunction for protection against stalking violence because the evidence did not support a finding of repeat harassment); Carter v. Malken , 207 So. 3d 891, 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ("A minimum of two incident…
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Krapacs v. Nisha E. Bacchus, 301 So. 3d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)…Krapacs’ actions do not qualify as cyberstalking because they did not constitute a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over time evidencing a continuity of purpose. See § 784.048(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2018); 4 Packal v. Johnson, 226 So. 3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (finding that multiple acts can “amount to one continuous course of conduct, establishing only one instance of harassment”). Krapacs’ act of retagging Bacchus in her social media posts for four hours constitutes one ins…
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Cash v. Gagnon, 306 So. 3d 106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)…a. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting David v. Schack, 192 So. 3d 625, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)). Two or more acts that are part of one continuous course of conduct are legally insufficient to qualify as separate instances of harassment. See Packal v. Johnson, 226 So. 3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). Further, “a ‘course of conduct’ for purposes of the statute does not include protected speech. This includes speech that may be offensive or vituperative.” David v. Textor, 189 So. 3d 871, 876 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citatio…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Touhey v. Seda, 133 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
- Levy v. Jacobs, 69 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
- David v. Schack, 192 So. 3d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)
- Valdes v. Valdes, 192 So. 3d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)