TITUS L. HENLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellate court remanded for determination of Henley's eligibility for appointed counsel on appeal from probation revocation, distinguishing between representation during trial proceedings and representation for appellate purposes.
When a criminal proceeding has concluded and a probation revocation sentence has been imposed, the trial court must determine whether the defendant is eligible for appointed counsel for appeal purposes, even if counsel was appointed for the violation hearing itself.
[1] Appointment of counsel for trial proceedings does not automatically extend to appellate proceedings; separate determination of eligibility for appellate counsel is requir…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“to the assistance of counsel in taking said appeal at the expense of the State upon showing indigence”
The probation revocation sentencing order's advisement to the defendant regarding appellate counsel rights.
Henley was represented by court-appointed counsel at a probation violation hearing in case no. F09-16471A. The probation revocation sentencing order a…
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Titus L. Henley appeals from an order revoking his probation and seeks appointment of appellate counsel. It. appears from the record that Henley was represented by court-appointed counsel at the probation violation hearing, case no. F09-16471A. The probation revocation sentencing order states that the defendant has a right to assistance of counsel in taking an appeal from that order.
In the context of a pending criminal proceeding where it is clear that the defendant is currently represented, by counsel and hasn’t explicitly sought to discharge counsel in those proceedings, then dismissal per Logan would be appropriate. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla. 2003); see also Murray v. State, 1 So.3d 407, 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ( holding that prohibition on pro se motions by defendants who are represented by counsel only extends to the proceedings in which counsel represents the defendant). Here, however, the criminal proceeding has concluded and the order revoking Henley’s probation and imposing sentence has been rendered. The Order itself states that the court advised the defendant of his right “to the assistance of counsel in taking said appeal at the expense of the State upon showing indigence.”' There is nothing in the record before us to indicate that defendant’s counsel—appointed for the viola*360tion of probation hearing—was also appointed for purposes of appeal from that sentencing order. We therefore remand to the trial court for determination of Henley’s eligibility to have counsel appointed for purposes of appeal from the revocation of probation and sentence.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Logan v. State, 846 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2003)
- Murray v. State, 1 So. 3d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)