WILLIAM C. MAWHINNEY AND RANDALL A. RALICKI, APPELLANTS,
v.
998 SW 144TH COURT RD, LLC, ET AL., APPELLEES
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This case involves an appeal of foreclosure judgments. The appellate court reversed the judgments, finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue them after the case was removed to federal court and before it was remanded.
No, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the final summary judgments because the filing of a notice of removal divests the state court of jurisdiction until the federal court remands the case.
[1] A state trial court lacks jurisdiction to enter orders after a notice of removal is filed in federal court and before the federal court remands the case.
[2] Proceedings conducted by a state court after a case has been removed to federal court, and prior to remand, are void ab initio.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold the final judgment entered by the court below after removal of the case to federal court (and prior to remand) is void because the circuit court no longer had jurisdiction.”
Establishes the core legal principle that judgments entered after removal but before remand are void.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants Ralicki and Mawhinney appeal summary final judgments of foreclosure entered against them. The trial court entered these judgments after a n…
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Randall A. Ralicki and William C. Mawhinney appeal the summary final judgments of foreclosure entered against them in favor of 998 SW 144th Court Rd, LLC. We are compelled to reverse because the trial court rendered the final summary judgments after the filing of a notice of removal to federal court and before the federal court remanded the case back to the trial court. Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the final summary judgments. See Cole v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 201 So.3d 749, 750 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016); Musa v. Wells Fargo Del. Tr. *469Co., 181 So.3d 1275, 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“We hold the final judgment entered by the court below after removal of the case to federal court (and prior to remand) is void because the circuit court no longer had jurisdiction.”); Preston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 627 So.2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (concluding that the filing of a notice of removal divests the state court of jurisdiction until the federal court enters an order of remand); see also Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., 861 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[Ajfter removal, the jurisdiction of the state court absolutely ceases and the state court has a duty not to proceed any further in the case. Any subsequent proceedings in state court on the case are void ab initio.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)). We reiterate, however, that upon remand, the trial court has the discretion to assess sanctions against Ralicki and Mawhinney if it determines that the case was removed to federal court as a delay tactic. See Musa, 181 So.3d at 1284 (Bilbrey, J., concurring) C‘[U]pon remand, the state court can assess sanctions for fraud on the court. While a variety of sanctions are available to the state court upon remand following an improper removal, ‘[t]he striking of a party’s pleadings “has long been an available and often favored remedy for a party’s misconduct in the litigation process.” ’ ” (citing Empire World Towers, LLC v. CDR Créances, S.A.S., 89 So.3d 1034, 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012))).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SAWAYA, TORPY and BERGER, JJ., concur.
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Ralicki v. 998 SW 144 Court RD, LLC, 254 So. 3d 1155 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)…ary judgment because the trial court [*1157] lacked jurisdiction when it rendered the judgment after Ralicki and Mawhinney filed their notice of removal to federal court and before the federal court remanded. Mawhinney v. 998 SW 144th Court Rd, LLC, 212 So. 3d 468, 468 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). In remanding the case, we noted that "the trial court has the discretion to assess sanctions against Ralicki and Mawhinney if it determines that the case was removed to federal court as a delay tactic." Id. at 469. In June…
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Authorities Cited
- Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 861 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir. 1988)
- Empire World Towers, LLC v. CDR Créances, 89 So. 3d 1034 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
- Preston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 627 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Joseph A. and Mary Ann Musa v. Wells Fargo Del. Tr. Co., 181 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
- Cole v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 201 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)
- Waller v. State, 201 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)