MARISSA CONTES, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Marissa Contes was convicted of burglary and grand theft. The appellate court affirmed her burglary conviction, holding that evidence of her serving as a lookout was sufficient to establish her guilt as a principal to the crime. However, the court reversed the grand theft conviction because the State failed to prove the stolen property exceeded $300 in value, and remanded for entry of a petit theft conviction instead.
The court held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Contes guilty as a principal to burglary based on her participation as a lookout, and that the burglary conviction should be affirmed. However, because the State failed to establish the required value threshold, the grand theft conviction was reversed and the case remanded for entry of a petit theft conviction.
[1] Evidence of serving as a lookout is sufficient to establish intent to participate in a burglary, making the lookout guilty as a principal.
[2] A conviction for grand theft requires proof that the value of the stolen property exceeded the statutory threshold.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to determine that Marissa Contes was not merely present, but intended to and did participate in the crime by serving (as an eyewitness described) as a lookout for her co-defendant during the commission of a burglary, and was therefore guilty as a principal to the crime of burglary”
Establishes the sufficiency of evidence standard for accomplice liability based on serving as a lookout
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarissa Contes was tried for burglary and grand theft. An eyewitness described Contes as serving as a lookout for her co-defendant during the commissi…
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Upon our de novo review of the record, we hold that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to determine that Marissa Contes was not merely present, but intended to and did participate in the crime by serving (as an eyewitness described) as a lookout for her co-defendant during the commission of a burglary, and was therefore guilty as a principal to the- crime of - burglary. See § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2013); C.L.A. v. State, 478 So.2d 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Cf. In the Interest of A.R., 460 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). We therefore affirm *199the judgment and sentence for the burglary charge.
However, we reverse the judgment and sentence for the charge of grand theft, as the State failed to establish that the property stolen was valued at more than $300, as required for grand theft of the third-degree. See § 812.014(l)(c)l, Fla. Stat. (2013). “Value” for purposes of theft under this section means “the market value of the property at the time and place of the offense.... ” See § 812.012(10)(a)l, Fla. Stat. (2014); K.W. v. State, 13 So.3d 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Because the evidence failed to establish the fair market value of the property at the time of the offense, Contes can be convicted only of second-degree petit theft, a second-degree misdemeanor. See § 812.0l4(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). We remand this cause to the trial court to vacate the judgment and sentence on the charge of grand theft and to enter judgment for second-degree misdemeanor petit theft. The court shall conduct a sentencing hearing, at which Contes has a right to be present, for the purpose of imposing sentence on the judgment for petit theft.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part,- and remanded with instructions.-
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Y.R. v. State, 226 So. 3d 1008 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…e for a comparable and comparably-used iPad. While this may seem an onerous burden, there can be no doubt that proof of “value” as defined in section 812.012(10) is determinative in classifying the level of the offense. Here, as in Contes v. State, 190 So. 3d 198, 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), “[because the evidence failed to establish the fair market value of the property at the time of the offense, [the defendant] can be convicted only of second-degree petit theft, a second-degree misdemeanor.” We thus remand th…
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D.J.S. v. State, 242 So. 3d 448 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…. . . minimum value [of the property] can be ascertained, the value is an amount less than $100."). ---PAGE 3--- Accordingly, the finding of guilt as to the grand theft must be reduced to one for second-degree petit theft. See Contes v. State, 190 So. 3d 198, 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) ("Because the evidence failed to establish the fair market value of the property at the time of the offense, [the defendant] can be convicted only of second- degree petit theft."). As such, we reverse the trial court's di…
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Wade v. State, 274 So. 3d 479 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In the Interest of A.R., 460 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- K.W. v. State, 13 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)
- C.L.A. v. State, 478 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)