BESSEMER PROPERTIES, INCORPORATED AND SUBURBAN MIAMI INVESTMENT CORPORATION, APPELLANTS.
v.
MIAMI SHORES VILLAGE, APPELLEE
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Bessemer Properties challenged a Miami Shores zoning ordinance that restricted their R-20 zoned property to residential and certain other uses, preventing development as hotels or motels. The court affirmed the dismissal of their complaint, holding that where the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable based on competent evidence, courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the municipal council.
The court held that the zoning ordinance was not unreasonable because the reasonableness of the restriction was fairly debatable based on competent evidence supporting both the ordinance and the property owners' position. When the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable, courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the municipal council.
“We agree with appellants that where there is no basis whatever for the zoning limitation upon the use of the land, then the restriction is arbitrary and unreasonable and the court is justified in upsetting the ordinance.”
Establishes the legal standard for when a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional, but distinguishes cases where some basis exists.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBessemer Properties and Suburban Miami Investment Corporation owned two non-contiguous tracts of land in Miami Shores fronting on U.S. Highway #1, whi…
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The appellants are the owners of two non-contiguous tracts of land in the Village of Miami Shores, fronting on U. S. Highway #1 which at this point carries a high volume of traffic — over 30,000 vehicles daily. The volume of traffic is one of the facts upon which the appellants relied. The land is zoned by ordinance 270, under classification designated as R-20, which permits the following uses:
1. Single family dwellings with a minimum cubage of 20,000 feet;
2. Place of worship;
3. Public schools;
4. Parks, playgrounds and accompanying uses;
5. Homes, professions and offices;
6. Home occupations;
7. Tilling of the soil;
8. Incidental signs;
9. Subject to approval of the Village Council:
(a) Private schools;
(b) Public utilities.
The owners, wishing to use the land for hotels or motels, attacked the ordinance as an unreasonable restraint upon the use of the land. After a two-day trial, the chancellor found that the unreasonableness of the ordinance was fairly debatable, since there was competent evidence on both sides of the issue, and dismissed the complaint. We conclude that this decree is correct.
We agree with appellants that where there is no basis whatever for the zoning limitation upon the use of the land, then the restriction is arbitrary and unreasonable and the court is justified in upsetting the ordinance. Lippow v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.1953, 58 So.2d 827. Plowever, such facts do not exist in the present case. The chancellor found that there was com*88petent evidence to sustain the ordinance. It does not matter that there was competent evidence against the reasonableness of the ordinance, for such evidence might well have sustained the position of the village council had it enacted an ordinance to permit motels on the land in question or amended the existing ordinance to permit such use. Such legislation, under either proposition, could not be said, as a matter of law, to be unreasonable.
Since the reasonableness of the ordinance is fairly debatable, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the municipal council. City of Miami Beach v. Silver, Fla.1953, 67 So.2d 646; City of Miami Beach v. Prevatt, Fla.1957, 97 So.2d 473; Town of Surfside v. Abelson, Fla.App.1958, 106 So.2d 108.
The chancellor was correct in applying this principle by dismissing the complaint. The decree appealed from should be and it is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
HORTON, Acting Chief Judge, and PEARSON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (15 total)
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Elbert Miles v. Dade Cnty., 260 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…he decision thereon had adequate evidentiary support, a court called upon for review thereof should not negate the action by substituting its judgment for that of the legislative body. Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Miami Shores Village, Fla.App.1959, 110 So. 2d 87; Dade County v. Epstein, Fla.App.1966, 181 So. 2d 556. The fact that the Zoning Appeals Board held a view as to the propriety of the zoning change, which was opposite to that subsequently taken by the county commission, did not serve to render the l…
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Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Greenlee, 224 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)…sufficient ground to authorize a change in residential zoning. See City of South Miami v. Alvin, Fla.App.1966, 189 So. 2d 386; Snipes v. City of Hialeah, Fla.App.1959, 114 So. 2d 214; Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Miami Shores Village, Fla.App.1959, 110 So. 2d 87. In City of Miami v. Zorovich, Fla. App.1967, 195 So. 2d 31, 36, we held: * * * * * * “ * * * ¿4 zoning ordinance is not invalid merely because it prevents the owner from using the property in the manner which is economically most advantageous. I…
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Dade Cnty. v. United Res., Inc., 374 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…evidence against the reasonableness of a resolution, it is only necessary that the resolution be supported by competent substantial evidence to show that the matter is fairly debatable. See, e. g., Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Miami Shores Village, 110 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). Also, in applying the fairly debatable rule, a zoning resolution is not invalid merely because it prevents owners from using their property in a manner which is economically most advantageous. See, e. g., Metropolitan Dade County…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- City OF Miami Beach v. Prevatt, 97 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1957)
- Town OF Surfside v. Abelson, 106 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- City of Miami Beach v. Silver, 67 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1953)