RALEIGH FLINT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Raleigh Flint appeals the denial of his postconviction motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court summarily denied relief, but the appellate court reversed on the ineffective assistance ground and remanded for an evidentiary hearing because the record did not conclusively refute Flint's allegations.
The appellate court reversed the summary denial of ground one because the postconviction record supported Flint's allegations and did not conclusively refute the claim that counsel advised him to reject a reasonable plea offer based on unreasonable confidence in acquittal. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
[1] A defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on advice to reject a plea offer may warrant postconviction relief if the advice was unreasonable and the r…
[2] Summary denial of a motion for postconviction relief is improper when the record does not conclusively refute the defendant's allegations regarding ineffective assistance…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“there was overwhelming physical and testimonial evidence against him”
Flint's allegation regarding the strength of evidence supporting the conviction that made counsel's advice to reject the plea offer unreasonable
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFlint's trial counsel informed him the State offered concurrent five-year sentences in exchange for guilty pleas to burglary of a conveyance and grand…
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Raleigh Flint appeals the order denying his motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3,850. We reverse the portion of the order that summarily denies relief on ground one of Mr. Flint’s motion and affirm without comment on the remaining portions of the postconviction court’s order.
In ground one of his motion, Mr. Flint alleged that his trial counsel’s advice to reject a plea offer amounted to ineffective *611assistance of counsel. He alleged that his trial counsel informed him that the State offered concurrent sentences of five years’ imprisonment in exchange for his guilty pleas to charges of burglary of a conveyance and grand theft. Trial counsel also advised him that if he proceeded to' trial and lost, he “more than likely” would be sentenced as a habitual'felony offender. However, Mr. Flint alleged that his trial counsel advised him to reject the plea offer because she felt she could win at trial.- In reliance on this advice, Mr. Flint proceeded to trial, was found guilty-as charged, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of ten years’ imprisonment as a habitual felony offender. Mr, Flint now contends that trial counsel’s confidence in a favorable verdict and advice to reject the plea offer were unreasonable because “there ’ was overwhelming physical and testimonial evidence against him.” ' -
The posttconviction record supports Mr. Flint’s allegation that the evidence against him, at least at the time of trial, was “overwhelming.” Moreover, the postcon-viction record does not conclusively refute his claim that his trial counsel advised him to reject the State’s plea offer or that such advice would have been unreasonable at the time it was allegedly given. See Perez v. State, 893 So.2d 629, 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (reversing summary denial of rule 3.850 motion where the record did not refute the appellant’s allegation that he injected' a favorable plea offer based on trial counsel’s “incompetent” advice that “he was likely to be acquitted”). Because the present record does not conclusively refute ground one of Mr.' Flint’s motion, we reverse the postconviction court’s order insofar as.it denies ground one and remand for further- proceedings. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D) (“On appeal from the denial of relief, unless the record shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief, the order shall be-reversed and the pause remanded for an evidentiary hearing or other appropriate relief.”). ,
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.
KELLY, WALLACE, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.