STEPHEN J. KNEAPLER, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 2015-05-27
Nos. 3D14-2501, 3D14-2500, 3D14-16
Before SHEPHERD, C.J., and SUAREZ and LOGUE, JJ.
173 So. 3d 1002 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2015) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Stephen Kneapler, a Miami taxpayer and member of the selection committee for a city property lease, challenged the city's leasing procedures on Charter grounds. The district court affirmed summary judgment for the city, holding that Kneapler lacked standing as a taxpayer because he failed to allege a special injury distinct from other voters.


Holding

Kneapler lacked standing because he failed to allege a special injury distinct from that suffered by other voters in the city. To challenge a municipal referendum resolution, a plaintiff must allege a special injury different in kind from the general injury to voters.


Headnotes

[1] A plaintiff must allege a special injury distinct from that suffered by others in the district to have standing to challenge the validity of a municipal resolution direct…

[2] A taxpayer lacks standing to challenge a municipal lease of city property if they have not alleged a special injury different in kind from that of any other voter in the…

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Key Quotes

“To have standing to challenge the validity of a resolution passed by a municipality directing a referendum to be placed on the general election ballot, a plaintiff must allege that he has suffered or will suffer a special injury which is distinct from that suffered by others in the district.”

Establishes the legal standard for taxpayer standing in referendum challenges under Florida law

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Facts & Procedural History

In January 2013, the City of Miami issued an RFP for development of approximately seven acres of city property with a 50-year lease option. Kneapler s…

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Opinion of the Court
SUAREZ, J.

SUAREZ, J.

Stephen J. Kneapler seeks to reverse a final order granting the City of Miami’s and Grove Bay Investment Group’s motions for summary judgment, and the denial of Mr. Kneapler’s motion for partial summary judgment. We affirm.

The Court heard this case on the same calendar as the case of Solares v. City of Miami, et al., Case Number 3D14-2237. Both cases are taxpayer suits and both allege violation by the City of Miami Charter, section 29-B and Sec. 3(f)(iii) in the leasing of City property. Solares concerns the lease by the City of property at Bay-side and Mr. Kneapler’s suit concerns the City’s lease of almost seven (7) acres of City property located on Pan American Drive, Chart House Drive and South Bay-shore Drive. In both cases, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City because of the plaintiffs’ lack of standing to bring their respective suits. Based on years of Supreme Court and District Court of Appeal precedent regarding standing, we must affirm the trial court’s ruling, as Mr. Kneapler lacks standing to bring this suit.

This matter began in January 2013 when the City issued a Request for Proposal (“RFP”) for the development of the property in question, with a 50-year lease with options to extend. A Selection Committee was appointed that included Mr. Kneapler as a member. Of the two companies that made formal proposals to the Committee in response to the RFP, one withdrew, leaving only the proposal made by the Grove Bay Investment Group. On June 26, 2013, the Selection Committee,' by a three-to-one vote, recommended to the City Manager that the City accept the Grove Bay Investment Group’s proposal. The City Commission met on July 25, 2013, and agreed to place the proposal on the ballot for referendum vote in the November 5, 2013 election. A majority of the voters approved the proposal.

Mr. Kneapler filed his lawsuit shortly before the referendum election was to take place. Among other things, he claims the City violated the City Charter *1004Section 29-B and Section-. 3(f)(iii) in the procedure used by the City to select the Grove Bay Investment Group proposal. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City stating that Mr. Kneapler did not have standing to bring the suit. We affirm the trial court’s correct legal determination that

To have standing to challenge the validity of a resolution passed by a municipality directing a referendum to be placed on the general election ballot, a plaintiff must allege that he has suffered or will suffer a special injury which is distinct from that suffered by others in the district. (Citation omitted). Kneapler has not alleged a special injury different in kind than any other voter of the City, and therefore lacks standing.

Without reciting the lengthy history of the law of standing in the State of Florida, to which we are bound and cannot deviate, we adopt in full the opinion issued in Solares v. City of Miami, et al., Case Number 3D14-2237, which explains the principle of standing applied in these types of cases.1 Consequently, we need not address Mr. Kneapler’s remaining issues on appeal.2

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Herbits v. The City OF Miami, 207 So. 3d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
    …s a duly enacted source of rights and standing, the Citizens’ Bill of Rights was neither raised nor considered in the taxpayer standing decisions of the Florida Supreme Court cited above, or in our decisions in Solares and Kneapler v. City of Miami, 173 So. 3d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). The fact that standing was conferred by the Citizens’ Bill of Rights does not, however, end our analysis of Count IV, a claim found legally insufficient for other reasons. A. Count I: City of Miami Charter Section 29-B In Count…

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