GOUZHEN SHANG, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed the Department of Health's revocation of a massage therapist's license because the Department failed to properly serve the licensee by publication as required by statute.
Service by publication under section 120.60(5), Florida Statutes, is only permitted when personal service cannot be made and certified mail notice is returned undelivered, and must occur in the county of the licensee's last known address.
[1] Service by publication under section 120.60(5), Florida Statutes, requires that personal service cannot be made and certified mail notice is returned undelivered, and ser…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[W]hen personal service cannot be made and the certified mail notice is returned undelivered.”
Statutory requirement for service by publication under section 120.60(5), Florida Statutes
Gouzhen Shang's massage therapy license was revoked by the Department of Health. The Department attempted to serve her by publication, but did not est…
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Gouzhen Shang, Appellant, appeals a final order of the Department of Health revoking her license to practice massage therapy. We reverse because the record does not support the Department’s finding that she was properly served by publication. Section 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (2013), permits service by publication in the county of the licensee’s last known address, but only “[w]hen personal service cannot be made and the certified mail notice is returned undelivered.” The Department’s attempt at service by publication was not in the county of Appellant’s last known address, and the Department did not establish that the prerequisites to service by publication were met. Although the Department argues on appeal that it actually served Appellant by certified mail, we cannot rely on this claim because the final order does not find that such service was made. See Wood v. Blunck, 152 So.3d 693, 695 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (noting that an appellate court must not usurp the role of the fact finder when employing the tipsy coachman doctrine). In fact, by finding that service was made by publication, the final order necessarily found that service was not effectuated by certified mail. For these reasons, we reverse the order revoking Appellant’s license.
REVERSED.
THOMAS, WETHERELL, and RAY, JJ., concur.