FRANK P. LARWA, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE O/B/O LYNNE M. ROUSH, APPELLEE
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A trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to modify or extend child support within an existing case once a child is emancipated, even if the child is mentally incapacitated.
The Department of Revenue sought to extend a father's child support obligation for his eighteen-year-old son due to the son's mental disability. The t…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On motion for rehearing, the Department of Revenue seeks clarification of our prior opinion in this case. We grant the Department’s motion, withdraw our prior opinion; and substitute this opinion in its place.
Frank Larwa appeals a final order that extended his child-support obligation to his eighteen-year-old son based upon the son’s mental disability. The Department concedes error.
Generally, a parent’s child-support obligation ceases when the child turns eighteen. See Perla v. Perla, 58 So.2d 689, 690 (Fla.1952). An exception to this general rule exists if the dependent person is between the ages of eighteen and nineteen and still in high school, or if the dependent is mentally or physically incapacitated. See § 743.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). Here, the extension of child support was based not on the son’s school attendance, but on his mental incapacity. In cases such as this one, once the child is emancipated, the trial court loses subject-matter jurisdiction to modify or extend child support within the existing child-support case.. See Taylor v. Bonsall, 875 So.2d 705 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Brown v. Brown, 714 So.2d 475 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). However, an independent action may be brought to adjudicate support of a dependent who has reached the age of majority. Brown, 714 So.2d at 477. That cause of action belongs to the dependent person, who may bring the action in accordance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(b). Id.
Under these principles, the trial court in this case lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to extend Larwa’s child-support obligation. Accordingly, we reverse.
REVERSED.
PALMER, COHEN, and BERGER, JJ., concur.
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Dep't OF Revenue O/B/O Willette Tisdale v. Otha L. Jackson, 217 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…ed eighteen pursuant to the high school provision of section 743.07(2)); Henderson v. Henderson, 882 So. 2d 499, 499-500 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (same). The hearing officer’s and trial court’s reliance upon Larwa v. Department of Revenue ex rel. Roush, 169 So. 3d 1285, 1285 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), is misplaced because the extension of child support in that case was “based not on the son’s [high] school attendance, but on his mental incapacity,” On rehearing, this court held that under those circumstances, an indepen…
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Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 220 So. 3d 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…e time period for recovery to twenty-four months prior to filing the petition). In this case, each of the parties’ children will be over the age of eighteen by the time Father is released from incarceration. See Larwa v. Dep't of Rev. ex rel. Roush, 169 So. 3d 1285, 1285 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) ("Generally, a parent's child-support obligation ceases when the child turns eighteen."); Campagna v. Cope, 971 So. 2d 243, 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (limiting section 61.30(17) petition for retroactive child support to "those…
Authorities Cited
- Perla v. Perla, 58 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1952)
- Treva D. Brown v. Brown, 714 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Taylor v. Terrie E. Bonsall, 875 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)