TONSHAD LEVON CULPEPPER, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 2014-04-17
No. SC13-417
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
137 So. 3d 378 Florida Supreme Court (2014)

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction over a certified conflict case involving whether a defendant can be convicted of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property for the same criminal scheme. The Court quashed the Second District's affirmance of the conviction dismissal and remanded for reconsideration in light of its decision in Williams v. State, which held that such dual convictions violate Florida Statute § 812.025.


Holding

The Court held that dual convictions for dealing in stolen property and grand theft violate section 812.025, Florida Statutes, and that trial courts must provide jury instructions modeled after that statute and permit defense counsel to argue that the jury could find the defendant guilty of either offense but not both.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant cannot be convicted of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property when the offenses arise from the same scheme or course of conduct, pursuant to section…

[2] A trial court errs by denying a defendant's request for a jury instruction based on section 812.025, Florida Statutes, when the charges involve grand theft and dealing in…

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Key Quotes

“the defendant's convictions for dealing in stolen property and grand theft violated section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2008); that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request for a jury instruction modeled after that section; and that the trial court erred in precluding defense counsel from arguing during closing arguments that the jury could find the defendant guilty of either offense”

Establishes the three-part holding from Williams that controlled Culpepper's case and required reversal

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Facts & Procedural History

Culpepper was charged with both grand theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct. The trial court dismiss…

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Opinion of the Court
QUINCE, J.

QUINCE, J.

We have for review Culpepper v. State, 107 So.3d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), in which the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a conviction of grand theft when the defendant was charged with both grand theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct. The Second District certified conflict with Kiss v. State, 42 So.3d 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), and certified the same questions it had certified in Williams v. State, 66 So.3d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), quashed, 121 So.3d 524 (Fla.2013). At the time that the Second District issued its decision below, Williams was pending review in this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

We stayed proceedings in this case pending disposition of Williams v. State, 121 So.3d 524 (Fla.2013). In Williams, we held that the defendant’s convictions for dealing in stolen property and grand theft violated section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2008); that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a jury instruction modeled after that section; and that the trial court erred in precluding defense counsel from arguing during closing arguments that the jury could find the defendant guilty of either offense. Id. at 534. We concluded that the errors were harmful and quashed the Second District’s decision. Id. We then issued an order in the instant case directing Respondent to show cause why this Court should not accept jurisdiction, summarily quash the Second District’s decision below, and remand for reconsideration in light of our decision in Williams. Respondent filed a response conceding that it was “unable to show cause why this Court should not accept jurisdiction and remand for reconsideration in light of its opinion in Williams.” Petitioner did not file a reply.

Upon consideration of Respondent’s response, we grant the petition for review, quash the district court’s decision in Cul-pepper, and remand this case to the Second District with instruction that the case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Court’s decision in Williams.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.


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