JP MORGAN HOME FINANCE, LLC, APPELLANT,
v.
MARTHA VALENCIA, ET AL., APPELLEE
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JP Morgan Home Finance appeals a trial court's dismissal of a mortgage foreclosure action for lack of prosecution. The court reversed, holding that under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), any filing of record within the 60-day grace period precludes dismissal, and JP Morgan's timely filings satisfied this requirement.
The trial court erred in dismissing the action. Under the 2006 amendments to Rule 1.420(e), any filing of record within the 60-day grace period precludes dismissal. JP Morgan's multiple filings, including the showing of good cause, satisfied this bright-line rule, and the dismissal must be reversed.
[1] Trial court orders entered and filed to resolve motions properly filed in good faith constitute record activity that precludes dismissal for failure to prosecute.
[2] Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e) requires dismissal of actions with no record activity for one year, unless good cause is shown.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The Florida Supreme Court has held that under the 2006 amendments to Rule 1.420(e) any filing of record within the sixty-day grace period precludes dismissal.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for Rule 1.420(e) dismissals.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJP Morgan filed a mortgage foreclosure suit against Martha Valencia. On April 16, 2012, the trial court issued a notice of lack of prosecution under R…
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JP Morgan Home Finance, LLC, (“JP Morgan”), appeals the entry of an order of dismissal for lack of prosecution, as well as an order denying its motion to vacate the dismissal order. On April 16, 2012, the trial court entered a notice of lack of prosecution in the underlying mortgage foreclosure suit pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e).1 The docket re-*637fleets that JP Morgan then filed a motion to substitute the party plaintiff, which was granted by order of the court. On May 16, 2012, thirty days after the notice was issued, JP Morgan filed a showing of good cause as to why the action should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution. JP Morgan’s counsel then attended the hearing on the court’s motion to dismiss on June 28, 2012. However, an order of dismissal was entered that same day. This order was followed by an ancillary order stating the trial court would consider JP Morgan’s motion to vacate dismissal if it filed a notice of readiness for trial or noticed a summary judgment hearing within ten days. JP Morgan has timely appealed these orders.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that under the 2006 amendments to Rule 1.420(e) any filing of record within the sixty-day grace period precludes dismissal. Chemrock Corp. v. Tampa Elec. Co., 71 So.3d 786, 792 (Fla.2011). The record reflects that JP Morgan made multiple filings within the relevant sixty-day period, including a showing of good cause. There is no transcript of the June 28 hearing and no other record evidence to explain the trial court’s reasoning for entering the order of dismissal or the ancillary order. Moreover, the appellee has failed to file an answer brief or memorandum of points. However, the conditions imposed in the ancillary order suggest the trial court sought to encourage active record activity and hasten resolution on the merits. The supreme court has expressly rejected this distinction between active and passive record activity, stating:
By creation of the sixty-day grace period, it was not our intention to create a situation in which the plaintiff or the trial court must again guess at what type of record activity will be required. ... [T]he bright-line interpretation ..., under which any filing of record is sufficient to preclude dismissal, applies....
Id. The trial court erred by dismissing the action where the plaintiff made a timely filing of record.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to vacate the order of dismissal and reinstate the action.