CLENTON MURPHY, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Clenton Murphy appealed his conviction for attempted kidnapping and his dual sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) and habitual felony offender (HFO). The court affirmed the PRR sentence but reversed the HFO sentence, finding that Murphy did not qualify for HFO sentencing under the 1996-amended statute because an escape from prison does not constitute a 'release' under the current statutory language.
Murphy does not qualify for HFO sentencing under the current statute because an escape from prison is not a 'release' within the meaning of the HFO statute. The court affirmed the PRR sentence, which specifically includes escape status as a qualifying factor, but reversed the HFO sentence.
[1] A defendant may not be sentenced as a habitual felony offender if the statutory language defining eligibility has been amended to exclude the conduct in question, even if…
[2] Escape from prison does not constitute a 'release' for purposes of habitual felony offender sentencing under the current statutory scheme.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We have previously held that an escape is not a release.”
Establishes the key legal principle distinguishing escape from authorized release under the HFO statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMurphy was convicted by jury of attempted kidnapping in 2011. He had previously escaped from prison. At sentencing, the trial court imposed both a PRR…
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Clenton Murphy, Jr., appeals his judgment and habitual felony offender (HFO) sentence of twenty years in prison followed by ten years on probation. A jury convicted Mr. Murphy of attempted kidnapping. The trial court sentenced him as both a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) and a HFO. Mr. Murphy argues that he did not qualify for HFO sentencing under the statute in effect at the time of his crime. The State agrees. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(A). We affirm Mr. Murphy’s judgment and PRR sentence but reverse his HFO sentence.
At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that Mr. Murphy qualified as a HFO under Jeffries v. State, 610 So.2d 440, 441 (Fla.1992). The State argued that a release from prison “on parole or otherwise” allowed Mr. Murphy to be sentenced as a HFO because Mr. Murphy had escaped from prison. Indeed, Jeffries recites that “[cjrimes committed after an escape from prison, for example, would fall within that portion of the statute applicable to releases from prison ‘on parole or otherwise.’” Id. Jeffries was decided pursuant to the statute in effect in 1988. See § 775.084(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988).
However, in 1996, the legislature removed the “on parole or otherwise” term. See ch. 96-388, § 44, at 2330, Laws of Fla. The statute in effect at the time of Mr. Murphy’s 2011 offense stated as follows:
(1) As used in this act:
(a) “Habitual felony offender” means a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in paragraph (4)(a), if it finds that:
1. The defendant has previously been convicted of any combination of two or more felonies in this state or other qualified offenses.
2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed:
a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense; or
b. Within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the defendant’s last prior felony or other qualified offense, or within 5 years of the defendant’s release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, control release, conditional release, parole or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision or other *1092sentence that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, whichever is later.
§ 775.084, Fla. Stat. (2010).
We have previously held that an escape is not a release. See Thomas v. State, 741 So.2d 1246, 1246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citing section 775.021(1), which provides that criminal statutes must “be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused”). The State concedes that the trial court’s reliance on Jeffries was error and that Mr. Murphy does not qualify for HFO sentencing.
We note that the applicable PRR statute defines escape status as a qualifier under its provisions. See § 775.082(9)(a)(2). Thus, we affirm the judgment and fifteen-year mandatory PRR sentence but must reverse the HFO sentence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
DAVIS and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Patterson v. State, 240 So. 3d 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)
Authorities Cited
- Jeffries v. State, 610 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1992)
- Thomas v. State, 741 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)