MARIANGELICA QUINTERO ETC., APPELLANT,
v.
JOSE S. RODRIGUEZ, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the former wife attorney's fees, despite imputing income to her.
[1] A trial court may impute income to a party when determining alimony.
[2] Even with imputed income, a party may still demonstrate need for attorney's fees if their remaining surplus is insufficient to cover legal costs.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe former wife appealed the final judgment dissolving her marriage, arguing errors in alimony and attorney's fees awards. The trial court imputed inc…
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Mariangelica Quintero (“former wife”) appeals the final judgment dissolving her marriage to Jose Rodriguez (“former husband”). She first argues that the trial court erred by imputing income to her, resulting in an error in failing to award her permanent periodic alimony.1 Alternatively, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award her at least $1 in nominal permanent periodic alimony. Finally, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award her trial-level attorney’s fees and costs based upon her need and the former husband’s ability to pay. Although we find no basis to reverse the trial court’s alimony rulings, we agree that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award the former wife attorney’s fees.
The trial court’s decision to deny the former wife’s attorney’s fee motion was premised upon the imputation of income to her, which is allowed by law. See Arouza v. Arouza, 670 So.2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). However, even with her imputed *957income, the former wife is left with a negligible surplus of available funds each month (accepting the trial court’s findings as to her reasonable and necessary monthly expenses), which is clearly insufficient to pay her trial counsel’s fees. In contrast, the former husband was left with a healthy surplus each month, from which he has the ability to pay the former wife’s fees. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s denial of the former wife’s motion for fees was an abuse of discretion. Lowman v. Lowman, 724 So.2d 648, 650 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
Accordingly, we reverse the final dissolution order and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to award the former wife her reasonable attorney’s fees. See § 61.16, Fla. Stat. (2010).
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED with instructions.
PALMER, LAWSON and COHEN, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Lowman v. Lowman, 724 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Arouza v. Goldin C. Arouza, 670 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)