NOLA J. SHEDDEN AND WILLIAM J. SHEDDEN, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF MIAMI, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1958-10-02
No. 58-98
CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and HORTON and PEARSON, JJ., concur.
105 So. 2d 388 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1958) Positive Treatment
Cited by 26 cases

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Holding

A rear-end collision raises a presumption of negligence against the following driver, entitling the plaintiff to recover absent an explanation from the defendant.


Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiffs' automobile, stopped in traffic, was struck from behind by defendant's taxi. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, finding …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellants Ñola J. Shedden and her husband William J. Shedden filed a tort action against the appellee Yellow Cab Company of Miami, seeking damages, for personal injuries to Mrs. Shedden and damages to her automobile, and for loss of services and consortium of his wife and for medical expenses occasioned by her injuries, by Mr. Shedden.

This was a rear end collision case, in which the Shedden automobile was struck from behind by a cab owned by appellee. Defendant denied negligence.

At the trial it was shown that Mrs. Shed-den was a passenger in her automobile being driven by her husband; that while the Shedden automobile was halted for “two or three minutes” in a line of traffic, on Northwest 7th Avenue near the intersection of 69th Street, in the city of Miami, the defendant’s cab was driven into the rear of the plaintiff’s automobile, resulting in certain injuries and losses for which recovery was sought.

The court, at the close of the plaintiff’s case, directed a verdict for the defendant, on the theory that plaintiffs had not proved negligence of the driver of defendant’s cab.

In the case of McNulty v. Cusack, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 785, the Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District, speaking through Judge Allen, in an opinion filed August 29, 1958, held that a plaintiff’s *389proof of a rear end collision under circumstances such as were disclosed in this case raises a presumption of negligence of the driver of the car in the rear, on which a plaintiff would be entitled to recover, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant.

We observe that the able trial judge acted in this case without the benefit of the law as pronounced in the McNulty case, which had not then been decided.

According to the holding in McNulty v. Cusack, supra, the court erred in this case in granting the defendant’s motion for directed verdict. The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and HORTON and PEARSON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (13 total)

  • Gulle v. Purley L. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1965)
    …the factual situation involved produced in effect a rebuttable presumption and not a mere justifiable inference of negligence. The McNulty conclusion was approved by the Court of Appeal, Third District, in Shedden et al. v. Yellow Cab Co. of Miami, 105 So. 2d 388 and Cooper et al. v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 106 So. 2d 436. The rule of McNulty was given approval by the Supreme Court in Bellere et al. v. Madsen, 114 So. 2d 619, 80 A.L.R.2d 1 and by the Court of Appeal, First District in Pensacola Transit Co. v.…
  • Bellere v. Einar Madsen, 114 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1959)
    …affic light or at an intersection, there is a presumption of negligence of the defendant on which the plaintiff would be entitled to recover in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. See Shedden v. Yellow Cab Company of Miami, Fla.App.1958, 105 So. 2d 388, 389; McNulty v. Cusack, Fla.App.1958, 104 So. 2d 785. Here, the only reasonable inference from the evidence is that the defendant’s own negligence created or contributed to the creation of the sudden emergency. The rights of a pedestrian and a mot…
  • Pensacola Transit Co., Inc. v. Denton, 119 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
    …raffic light or at an intersection, there is a presumption of negligence of the defendant on which the plaintiff would be entitled to recover in the absence of an explanation by the defendant.” See also Shedden v. Yellow Cab Company, Fla.App., 1958, 105 So. 2d 388, and McNulty v. Cusack, Fla.App., 1958, 104 So. 2d 785. Under this just-quoted rule, properly considered, the question then is whether the explanation of the defendant’s driver is sufficient to permit the jury lawfully to conclude therefrom that th…

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