GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, PETITIONER,
v.
POLLIE DEGRANDCHAMP, RESPONDENT
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GEICO petitioned for a writ of certiorari to quash a trial court order awarding "contingent" attorneys' fees in an uninsured motorist benefits case. The appellate court dismissed the petition because the contingent fee order does not result in irreparable harm, particularly after the court had receded from the precedent supporting such awards.
The court dismissed the petition because the contingent fee order does not result in irreparable harm. Although the order may depart from the essential requirements of current law, it is not a judgment, is not subject to execution, does not create a lien, and is essentially a preemptive determination of issues that may or may not arise in a subsequent bad faith proceeding.
[1] A petition for writ of certiorari will be dismissed absent a showing of irreparable harm.
[2] An order determining contingent attorneys' fees is not a judgment and is not subject to execution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The order challenged in this certiorari proceeding is not a judgment and is not subject to execution. It does not create a lien against anyone's property.”
Establishes that the contingent fee order lacks the characteristics of a final, enforceable judgment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing a jury trial in an uninsured motorist benefits case brought by Pollie DeGrandchamp, the jury verdict substantially exceeded GEICO's insuranc…
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GEICO Indemnity Company (“GEICO”) petitions this court for a writ of certiorari to quash an order determining “contingent” attorneys’ fees in favor of the plaintiff. Because the order does not result in irreparable harm, we dismiss the petition.
The trial court entered this order following a jury trial in a case in which Pollie DeGrandchamp sought uninsured motorist benefits. The jury’s verdict was substantially in excess of the insurance coverage. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment for the amount of the insurance coverage, $10,000, and then proceeded to award “contingent” attorneys’ fees pursuant to our decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sutton, 707 So.2d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).1
Shortly after the trial court entered its order, this court receded from Sutton in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. King, 68 So.3d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). In King, we recognized that a judgment that is “contingent” would not be appeal-able and would not be binding on the finder of fact in any subsequent bad faith proceeding.2 Id. at 269-70. At the time the trial court entered its order in this case, however, it was following the existing precedent of this court.
The order challenged in this certiorari proceeding is not a judgment and is not subject to execution. It does not create a lien against anyone’s property. As we explained in King, it is essentially a preemptive determination of issues that may or may not arise in a subsequent action for bad faith. As such, although it may depart from the essential requirements of the current law of this court, we are unconvinced that it has or will cause any irreparable damage to GEICO. See Cruz v. Coopera-tiva De Seguros Multiples De P.R., Inc., 76 So.3d 394, 397-98 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that absent irreparable harm, dismissal of the petition is warranted). The relevance, if any, of this order in a subsequent lawsuit is a matter for resolution by the judge in that proceeding.
Petition dismissed.
CASANUEVA and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.
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State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Sanders (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…resent belief that Rios and Galvis have been undermined by subsequent developments in the law, or that Rios and Galvis and its progeny are no longer viable, or that we should recede from those decisions. See, e.g., GEICO Indem. Co. v. DeGrandchamp, 99 So. 3d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (denying cert petition, concluding trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law by following existing precedent at the time the trial court entered its order, even if the district court shortly thereafter…
Authorities Cited
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Vonnie B. Sutton, 707 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Cruz v. Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples de Puerto RICO, Inc., 76 So. 3d 394 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
- Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. King, 68 So. 3d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)