ANTHONY JOSEPH SHALEESH, APPELLANT,
v.
KARIN MARIE SHALEESH, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2012-08-22
No. 3D11-3137
Before CORTIÑAS, SALTER and EMAS, JJ.
95 So. 3d 459 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2012)

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Synopsis

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed an award of $85,000 in attorney's fees to the former wife in a divorce case, but remanded for the trial court to clarify whether it credited a $9,300 interim payment and to remove an acceleration clause from the fee award order.


Holding

The fee award itself was affirmed, but the trial court must issue an amended order clarifying whether the $9,300 interim payment was credited against the $85,000 award and, if so, how that credit was applied. Additionally, the acceleration clause must be removed from the order as the former wife stipulated she would not seek its enforcement.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must clarify whether a prior payment of temporary fees was credited in its final attorney's fee award calculation.

[2] An acceleration clause in an attorney's fee award order may be removed upon stipulation of the party seeking enforcement.

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Key Quotes

“The trial court acknowledged in its order that the former wife's counsel 'has received only $9,300 on account, which was the sum that the Court ordered on October 4, 2011 for temporary fees — and he had to file a Motion for Contempt to enforce that order to receive that payment.'”

Demonstrates the trial court's awareness of the interim payment but the order's failure to clarify whether this amount was credited against the final fee award.

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Facts & Procedural History

In a family law dispute, the former wife's counsel submitted a fee claim for 264.45 hours billed at a blended hourly rate of $376.25, totaling approxi…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm in all other respects the order granting the former wife’s motion for attorney’s fees, but remand for the trial court to enter an amended order addressing two issues:

1. The trial court acknowledged in its order that the former wife’s counsel “has received only $9,300 on account, which was the sum that the Court ordered on October 4, 2011 for temporary fees — and he had to file a Motion for Contempt to enforce that order to receive that payment.” The order makes no further reference to this payment of $9300 by the former husband, and it remains unclear whether the trial court intended to include (and in fact included) a credit for that amount in its calculation of the ultimate fee award of $85,000.1 The trial court shall amend the order to reflect whether such a credit was intended to be included and, if so, how that credit was applied in the court’s calculation and award.

2. The order contains an “acceleration clause.”2 On appeal, the former wife stip*460ulated that she will not seek enforcement of that clause, and the trial court shall remove the acceleration clause from its order granting attorney’s fees.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.


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