IN THE INTEREST OF G.M., A CHILD. M.W., APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, APPELLEES
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Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her child, arguing the trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support a single-parent termination order. The appeal became moot when the Father subsequently surrendered his parental rights, eliminating the need for the trial court to make section 39.811(6) findings.
The appeal is moot because the Father's subsequent voluntary termination of his own parental rights eliminates any need for the trial court to make findings under section 39.811(6) to support a single-parent termination.
[1] An appeal challenging the sufficiency of findings for a single-parent termination order is moot when the other parent subsequently surrenders their parental rights, rende…
[2] A prior reversal of a termination of parental rights order as to one parent does not automatically invalidate a termination order as to the other parent.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The intervening termination of the [Father's] rights obviates any alleged need for the trial court to make findings under section 39.811(6).”
Establishes the legal principle that when a co-parent's rights are subsequently terminated, single-parent termination findings are no longer necessary, rendering the appeal moot.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn March 16, 2011, the circuit court terminated both parents' parental rights to G.M., finding both had failed to comply with and materially breached …
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M.W., the Mother, appeals the circuit court’s denial of her motion to set aside the final judgment of termination of parental rights to G.M.1 She argues that the court erred by failing to make sufficient findings to support a single-parent termination order under section 39.811(6), Florida Statutes (2011). Because this issue is now moot, we dismiss the appeal.
On March 16, 2011, the circuit court entered an order terminating both the Mother’s and the Father’s parental rights to G.M. The court found that both parents had failed to comply with and had materially breached the case plan. The court also determined that the Father had abandoned the child.
Both parents appealed. The Mother’s appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute after her attorney found no meritorious grounds on which to base the appeal and the Mother failed to file a pro se brief. The Father’s appeal, on the other hand, resulted in a reversal. See G.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 71 So.3d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). This court found that the circuit court improperly terminated the *1034Father’s rights for failure to comply with the case plan because the Father did not have the opportunity to comply — he had been incarcerated for the duration of the case and the Department of Corrections had failed to assist him in completing the case plan tasks. Id. at 926. Further, this court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding that the Father had abandoned the child. Id. at 926-27. On remand, the circuit court accepted a new case plan for the Father with the goal of reunification.
The Mother filed a motion to set aside the final judgment as to the termination of her parental rights because the judgment had already been reversed as to the termination of the Father’s parental rights and the court had not made findings sufficient to support a single-parent termination order under section 39.811(6), Florida Statutes. The circuit court denied the Mother’s motion, stating that it would reconsider the motion if the Father was reunified with the child.
The Father surrendered his parental rights on April 12, 2012, and a final judgment terminating his parental rights was entered on April 23, 2012, nunc pro tunc to April 12, 2012. “The intervening termination of the [Father’s] rights obviates any alleged need for the trial court to make findings under section 39.811(6)....” A.G. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 932 So.2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
Dismissed.
DAVIS and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.
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- Ericson v. State, 932 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
- A.G. v. Dep't OF Child. & Fam. Servs., 932 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
- In the Interest of G.M., JR. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. & Guardian Ad Litem Program, 71 So. 3d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)