IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF K.R.C., LEROY H. MERKLE, JR., P.A., APPELLANT,
v.
ROCHELLE P. WEEMS, AS GUARDIAN OF K.R.C., APPELLEE
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A trial court denied an attorney's petition for fees and costs incurred in administering a prior fee award in a guardianship matter, relying on precedent that prohibited recovery for work not directly benefiting the ward. The appellate court reversed, holding that a 2003 statute authorizes such fees if not substantially unreasonable.
Section 744.108(8), Florida Statutes, adopted in 2003, supersedes prior precedent and authorizes recovery of attorney's fees for court proceedings instituted to review or determine a guardian's or attorney's fees, provided the requested compensation is not substantially unreasonable.
[1] A trial court errs by applying an outdated legal precedent that has been superseded by statute when determining attorney's fees in a guardianship matter.
[2] Statutory provisions authorizing fees for court proceedings to determine a guardian's or attorney's fees supersede prior case law that denied such fees when the work did…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When court proceedings are instituted to review or determine a guardian's or an attorney's fees under subsection (2), such proceedings are part of the guardianship administration process and the costs, including fees for the guardian's attorney, shall be determined by the court and paid from the assets of the guardianship estate unless the court finds the requested compensation under subsection (2) to be substantially unreasonable.”
The statutory provision that supersedes prior precedent and authorizes attorney's fee recovery for administrative work in fee proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLeRoy Merkle represented a guardian in a guardianship case and was subsequently discharged. He filed a petition for attorney's fees, which the trial c…
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LeRoy H. Merkle, Jr., appeals an order denying his petition for attorney’s fees and costs in a guardianship matter. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R.App. P. 9.080(b)(1)(A). The trial court applied the incorrect law. Accordingly, we must reverse.
Mr. Merkle represented the guardian of the ward, K.R.C. The guardian discharged Mr. Merkle as counsel and retained another law firm. Mr. Merkle then filed a petition for attorney’s fees related to his representation. The guardian objected. She argued that Mr. Merkle billed for administrative tasks. She also argued that the guardian could have performed these tasks at no cost to the ward. The trial court granted the petition but awarded fees for a lesser amount than requested.
Thereafter, Mr. Merkle filed a second petition for attorney’s fees and costs. The guardian again objected, arguing that Mr. Merkle billed for administrative tasks that did not benefit the ward. After an eviden-tiary hearing, the trial court ruled that Mr. Merkle was not entitled to fees and costs incurred postrepresentation for administrative tasks and follow-up relating to the prior fee order. The trial court relied on Zepeda v. Klein, 698 So.2d 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), which held that an attorney was not entitled to recover fees for time spent in collecting fees from the ward or the ward’s heirs because that work did not inure to the ward’s benefit and was not statutorily authorized. Id. at 330. In effect, the trial court ruled that Mr. Merkle could not recover fees for performing administrative tasks involved in litigating for fees. The trial court declined to address whether the second petition sought a reasonable fee award. We express no view on that issue.
We hold, however, that section 744.108(8), Florida Statutes (2010), first adopted in 2003, supersedes Zepeda and authorizes such fees that are not substantially unreasonable:
When court proceedings are instituted to review or determine a guardian’s or an attorney’s fees under subsection (2),[1] such proceedings are part of the guard*934ianship administration process and the costs, including fees for the guardian’s attorney, shall be determined by the court and paid from the assets of the guardianship estate unless the court finds the requested compensation under subsection (2) to be substantially unreasonable.
The trial court erred in relying on Zepe-da to deny Mr. Merkle’s second petition for attorney’s fees. We reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance with section 744.108.
Reversed and remanded.
SILBERMAN, C.J., and MORRIS, J., Concur.
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Citator
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- Donnabelle Zepeda and Jo Ann Rivera v. Klein, 698 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)