SANDRA JEWELL, APPELLANT,
v.
GEVITY HR AND CHARTISE INSURANCE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this workers' compensation case, the court reversed the JCC's apportionment order because the employer/carrier failed to establish merger with a preexisting condition as required by statute. The court held that merger requires a preexisting permanent impairment or disability, which was not proven here despite evidence of preexisting conditions.
The court held that the JCC erred in finding apportionment was appropriate. Merger under section 440.15(5)(b) requires a preexisting permanent impairment or disability by definition, and such a finding was not made here despite evidence of preexisting conditions. Therefore, the employer/carrier was not entitled to apportion benefits.
[1] Apportionment of workers' compensation benefits requires a finding of aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting condition, or a finding of merger with a preexisting co…
[2] Merger, for purposes of workers' compensation apportionment, requires a preexisting permanent impairment or disability.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Merger, however, is defined in section 440.15(5)(b) as: the combining of a preexisting permanent impairment or disability with a subsequent compensable permanent impairment or disability which, when the effects of both are considered together, result in a permanent impairment or disability rating which is greater than the sum of the two permanent impairment or disability ratings when each impairment or disability is considered individually.”
This quote establishes the statutory definition of merger and demonstrates that it requires a preexisting permanent impairment or disability.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClaimant injured her back in the course and scope of employment, which the employer/carrier accepted as compensable. The claimant's treating neurosurg…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Aggravation Of Pre-Existing Condition cases and more on FLexlaw
In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals from a final order finding the Employer/Carrier (E/C) entitled to apportionment. Because the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in his conclusion that the need for medical care is the result of merger with a preexisting condition, we reverse.
Claimant injured her back in the course and scope of her employment. The E/C accepted the accident as compensable and provided medical care. Claimant’s treating neurosurgeon eventually recommended surgery, but opined that 60% of the need for surgery was related to the industrial accident and 40% was related to preexisting conditions. As a result, the E/C authorized surgery, but asserted it was only responsible for 60% of the costs. Following an evidentiary hearing, the JCC entered a final order concluding the E/C was entitled to apportion 40% of Claimant’s “disability (if any) and medical care.”
In Staffmark v. Merrell, 43 So.3d 792, 795-96 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), we held section 440.15(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2008),1 permits apportionment of medical and indemnity benefits. Section 440.15(5)(b) allows for apportionment only “[i]f a com-pensable injury, disability, or need for medical care, or any portion thereof, is a result of aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting condition, or is the result of merger with a preexisting condition.... ” Accordingly, such apportionment requires either (1) a finding of aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting condition or (2) a finding of merger with a preexisting condition. The JCC did not find an aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting condition, but relied upon the treating neurosur*919geon’s opinions to find merger. Merger, however, is defined in section 440.15(5)(b) as:
the combining of a preexisting permanent impairment or disability with a subsequent compensable permanent impairment or disability which, when the effects of both are considered together, result in a permanent impairment or disability rating which is greater than the sum of the two permanent impairment or disability ratings when each impairment or disability is considered individually.
Thus, merger, by definition, cannot occur without a preexisting permanent impairment or disability. In this case, although there was evidence Claimant had preexisting conditions, there was no evidence Claimant had a preexisting permanent impairment or disability. Consequently, there could be no merger.
In view of our disposition of this appeal, we need not address the other issues raised by Claimant. The JCC’s order finding the E/C entitled to apportionment is REVERSED.
VAN NORTWICK and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Staffmark and Avizent/Frank Gates v. Merrell, 43 So. 3d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)