LIEBHERR-AMERICA, INC., ETC., AND ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE CO., APPELLANTS,

v.

WALTER MCCOLLUM, ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES

SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

On April 14, 2005, the plaintiffs’ decedent Audrey McCollum was run over and killed by a huge mobile crane at the Port of Miami. This case is an appeal by the entity whose role in the tragedy was confined to selling the crane to another defendant and agreeing to keep it in good repair. Although it neither designed, manufactured or operated the crane at the time of the accident, nor owned or controlled the property where Ms. McCollum was killed, the jury found it partially liable for the death. Because we find no legal basis for the appellant’s liability in this case, we reverse the ensuing judgment against it with directions to enter judgment in its favor.1

*67We consider and reject each of the even arguable bases upon which the appellant may be held liable:

(1) The primary duty and responsibility of a seller and servicer of equipment like Liebherr-America is ordinarily found in the claim that, at the time of the sale, the equipment contained a defect which rendered it unreasonably dangerous to persons in the vicinity of the crane. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla.1976); American Aerial Lift, Inc. v. Perez, 629 So.2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). There was much conflicting evidence in the case on that issue, but it fell completely out of the case when the jury found that the crane was not defective at the time of the sale. In this decisive respect the present case is identical to Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc. v. Medina, 719 So.2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), which alone requires reversal.

(2) An alternative argument pursued by the plaintiffs was an alleged breach of the appellant’s obligation to appropriately service the crane after its sale. It is true that there is some evidence that *68at the time of accident, some two years after the sale, one of the horns or other warning device was not operating properly. But this fact alone cannot give rise to liability in the absence of two crucial elements of such a claim. First, there was no evidence that the asserted failure (a) had previously occurred or (b) more important, that the appellant was on notice of such an impropriety, so that (c) even more significant, it had been guilty of any negligence in failing to repair it. Siemens, 719 So.2d at 315; Advance Chem. Co. v. Harter, 478 So.2d 444, 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Williams v. Joseph L. Rozier Machinery, Co., 135 So.2d 763, 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). Secondly, and independently, there was no showing that the failure of the horn had anything to do with, that is, was even a legal cause of the accident. See Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So.2d 1015, 1018 (Fla.1984); Proto v. Graham, 788 So.2d 393, 396 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

(3) The issue most emphasized by the appellees is the claim that there was a breach of a “duty to warn” of the dangers presented by the operating crane. We find it unnecessary to discuss at length the factual nuances of this claim or the appellants’ insistence that the danger was so open and obvious that no duty could arise. This is so because in what is essentially a product liability case like this, there is simply no duty on the part of a seller (or anyone in the distributive chain) to warn of dangers presented by its operation after it has passed from its control. Any such duty is placed either on the allegedly negligent operator of the crane, who was the employee of another defendant, or on the owner of the property on which the decedent was an invitee or licensee, which was still another. See Foley v. Hialeah Race Course, Inc., 53 So.2d 771 (Fla.1951); Food Fair, Inc. v. Gold, 464 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Schatz v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 128 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961). Despite the tragic aspects of this case, we cannot hold otherwise.

Reversed and remanded.