RAPHAEL MARICE TINSLEY, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 1st DCA | 2010-07-20
No. 1D10-2078
WOLF, KAHN, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ, concur.
41 So. 3d 334 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2010) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Raphael Marice Tinsley seeks a belated appeal although, in fact, his petition raises two different claims. In the first, he contends that he timely asked his trial counsel to appeal judgment and sentence. That claim is time-barred under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c)(4)(A) and we deny it as such.

Petitioner also contends that one or more attorneys agreed to file a motion for postconviction relief on his behalf and their failure to do so caused him to miss the time limitations set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b). Petitioner’s remedy regarding this claim is to file a motion for postconviction relief so stating in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(3). The petition, to the extent it seeks such relief, is therefore dismissed without prejudice to Tinsley’s right to file a motion in circuit court.

PETITION DENIED IN PART and DISMISSED IN PART.

WOLF, KAHN, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ, concur.


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  • Davis v. State, 56 So. 3d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
    …t, failed to file the motion.” If such a situation applies to the instant case, Appellant may seek a waiver of the two-year time limitation before the lower court so that the court may consider the merits of Appellant’s claims. See Tinsley v. State, 41 So. 3d 334 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Johnson v. State, 7 So. 3d 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). AFFIRMED. BENTON, C.J., DAVIS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.…
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