JOHN A. MIMS, BY AND THROUGH RAYMOND MIMS, HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, APPELLANT,
v.
AMERICAN SENIOR LIVING OF DADE CITY, FL, LLC, A/K/A ASL OF DADE CITY, FL, LLC, D/B/A EDWINOLA RETIREMENT COMMUNITY; NATIONAL ASSISTED LIVING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, A/K/A NATIONAL ASSISTED LIVING MANAGEMENT CORP.; AMERICAN SENIOR LIVING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; AMERICAN SENIOR LIVING, INC.; THOMAS E. RAWLES, JR.; GEORGE P. WAGNER, JR.; ALAN B. PARRISH; SHARON OSWALD; GRAHAM R. HUTCHINS, A/K/A GRAHAM HUTCHINS; AND KATHY FRITZLER (AS TO EDWINOLA RETIREMENT COMMUNITY), APPELLEES
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John A. Mims brought suit against an assisted living facility for alleged statutory violations. After Mims died during litigation, his counsel failed to timely substitute the estate's personal representative within the 90-day period required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.260(a)(1), resulting in dismissal with prejudice when the statute of limitations expired. The appellate court reversed, finding excusable neglect and applying the rule's liberal interpretation favoring disposition on the merits.
The court held that Rule 1.260(a)(1) has been liberally interpreted to permit substitution of parties beyond the 90-day period when excusable neglect is demonstrated. Because excusable neglect was established here and Florida courts have a long-standing tradition favoring disposition of actions on their merits, dismissal was improper and the case should proceed on the merits.
[1] A motion for substitution of a deceased party's personal representative must be served within ninety days of the filing of the suggestion of death, absent a showing of ex…
[2] A clerical error in counsel's office and delays in locating a deceased's last will and testament may constitute excusable neglect for untimely filing a motion for substit…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rule 1.260(a)(1) has been liberally interpreted to permit a substitution of parties beyond the ninety-day period set forth in the rule.”
Establishes the controlling standard that the rule allows flexibility beyond the strict 90-day deadline.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohn A. Mims was a resident at Edwinola Retirement Community and sued for alleged violations of his statutory rights. During litigation, Mims died. Hi…
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This appeal arises from a final order of dismissal of a lawsuit for damages resulting from alleged violations of John A. Mims’ statutory rights while he was a resident at Edwinola Retirement Community, an assisted living facility. We reverse.
Mr. Mims, the plaintiff, died during the course of his litigation against the defendants. Mr. Mims’ counsel first served and then filed a motion for substitution of the personal representative of Mr. Mims’ estate as the plaintiff, but the motion was served one hundred and fifteen days after the filing of the suggestion of death. This exceeded the ninety-day period set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.260(a)(1). Plaintiffs counsel presented evidence to the trial court that demonstrated excusable neglect for the untimely filing. Specifically, the evidence established that plaintiffs counsel overlooked the suggestion of death due to a clerical error in counsel’s office and that the appointment of the personal representative of the estate was delayed due to difficulties in locating Mr. Mims’ original last will and testament. Furthermore, the court filings revealed that plaintiffs counsel had actively litigated the lawsuit throughout the proceeding.
The trial court did not consider this evidence establishing excusable neglect and dismissed the complaint without prejudice because the personal representative of the estate had not been substituted within the ninety-day period set forth in rule 1.260(a)(1). At the time the trial court granted the motion and entered the order, the statute of limitations had expired. Mr. Mims’ counsel filed a third amended complaint naming the personal representative of the estate as the plaintiff. The third amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice because the statute of limitations had expired, and this appeal ensued.
Rule 1.260(a)(1) has been liberally interpreted to permit a substitution of parties beyond the ninety-day period set forth in the rule. See Tucker v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 552 So.2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Furthermore, “[t]he courts of this state have a long-standing tradition in favor of the disposition of an action on its merits.” Id. Here, as in Tucker, excusable neglect has been demonstrated and this action should proceed on the merits.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a vacation of the order of dismissal.
Reversed and remanded.
CASANUEVA, C.J., and KELLY, J., Concur.
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Citator
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Stern v. Hillel A. Horwitz, 249 So. 3d 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…izing that "the rule requires only that the 1Of course, this interpretation does not preclude a party from raising excusable neglect as a defense to dismissal under rule 1.260(a)(1). See Mims ex rel. Mims v. Am. Sr. Living of Dade City, FL, LLC, 36 So. 3d 935, 936 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Tucker v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 552 So. 2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). - 5 - motion for substitution be made within ninety days"); see also Eusepi v. Magruder Eye Inst., 937 So. 2d 795, 798 (Fla. 5th DCA 200…
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Sammons v. Greenfield, 270 So. 3d 534 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)…A 1989) (citations omitted). Further, this court has recognized that rule 1.260 "has been liberally interpreted to permit substitution beyond the ninety-day time period." Id.; see also Mims ex. rel. Mims v. Am. Sr. Living of Dade City, FL, LLC, 36 So. 3d 935, 936 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (same). Moreover, we have explained that "all doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing trial upon the merits." Tucker, 552 So. 2d at 1179; see also Rogers v. First Nat'l Bank at Winter Park, 232 So. 2d 377, 378 (Fla…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Emmett Tucker & Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. & Don Olson's Firestone, Inc., 552 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)