SELVIN DANIELS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Daniels challenges his sentencing under both the prison releasee reoffender and habitual felony offender statutes. The court holds that imposing equal concurrent life sentences under both statutes exceeds the trial court's authority, as the releasee reoffender statute permits deviation only to impose a greater sentence under the habitual felony offender statute.
The trial court lacked authority to impose equal concurrent sentences under both statutes. The prison releasee reoffender statute authorizes deviation only to impose a greater sentence under the habitual felony offender statute, and a life term under the habitual felony offender statute is not greater than a life term under the releasee reoffender statute.
[1] A trial court lacks the authority to impose equal, concurrent sentences under both the prison releasee reoffender statute and the habitual felony offender statute.
[2] The prison releasee reoffender statute permits a court to impose a greater sentence of incarceration under the habitual felony offender statute, but not an equal sentence…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The prison releasee reoffender statute authorizes a court to deviate from its statutory scheme only to impose 'a greater sentence of incarceration' under the habitual felony offender statute.”
Establishes the statutory limitation on the trial court's authority to impose sentences under both statutes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of armed robbery with a deadly weapon and burglary of a dwelling while armed. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent life…
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Appellant seeks review of a final order denying his amended postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Appellant contests six of the eight grounds raised in his motion. We find merit in Appellant’s argument that he was improperly sentenced to life imprisonment as both a prison releasee reoffender and a habitual felony offender. We affirm the denial of his other claims without comment.
Following his trial, Appellant was convicted of armed robbery with a deadly weapon and burglary of a dwelling while ai-med. For each conviction, the court sentenced Appellant to a concurrent term of life imprisonment under both the prison releasee reoffender statute and the habitual felony offender statute. In his 3.850 motion, Appellant argued his sentence was illegal because the law does not allow a trial court to impose equal sentences under both statutes.1
Appellant is correct. The prison releas-ee reoffender statute authorizes a court to deviate from its statutory scheme only to impose “a greater sentence of incarceration” under the habitual felony offender statute. § 775.082(9)(c), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added). “[B]ecause a life term under the habitual felony offender statute is not greater than a life term under the prison releasee reoffender statute, the trial court was without authority to [impose this sentence] under the habitual felony offender statute.” Walls v. State, 765 So.2d 733, 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); see also Grant v. *191 State, 770 So.2d 655, 659 (Fla.2000) (finding a court is without authority to sentence a defendant to equal, concurrent terms under the prison releasee reoffender statute and the habitual felony offender statute); Morris v. State, 910 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that “[ijmpos-ing sentences of equal length under both of these two statutes was error”); Lewis v. State, 819 So.2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (finding a defendant’s sentence to life imprisonment as a prison releasee reoffender and a habitual felony offender was not “authorized by law”).
Therefore, Appellant’s sentence must be reversed and remanded to strike his designation as a habitual felony offender. See Lewis, 819 So.2d at 1010. Because this is a purely ministerial act, Appellant’s presence is not required at resentencing. In all other respects, Appellant’s judgment and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED with instructions consistent with this opinion.
WOLF and KAHN, JJ„ concur.
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Diaz v. State, 146 So. 3d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…We agree that the HVFO sentence is illegal because it is the same length as the PRR. Thus, we reverse and remand for the trial court to strike appellant’s designation as an HVFO. See Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 658 (Fla.2000); Daniels v. State, 31 So. 3d 190, 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Because this is a purely ministerial act, appellant need not be present at resentenc-ing. On all other issues, we affirm. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. WOLF, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ.,…
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Nakia Simeton v. State, 117 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…e vacating the HVFO life sentence. See Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000); Roberts v. State, 798 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). As the state argues, this is a ministerial correction that does not require Simeton’s presence. Daniels v. State, 31 So. 3d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Simeton’s remaining claims are moot. Reversed and Remanded. DAMOORGIAN, C.J., GROSS and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.…
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Micole Atiya Jefferson v. State (Fla. 4th DCA 2024)…defendant’s sentence designating her as an HFO. We remand for the circuit court to strike the HFO designation from the defendant’s sentence. Because this is a purely ministerial act, the defendant’s presence is not required. See Daniels v. State, 31 So. 3d 190, 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (striking the defendant’s HFO designation on remand is a purely ministerial act not requiring the defendant’s presence). Second, the circuit court’s written judgment miscited section 784.045(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2017)…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- Walls v. State, 765 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Yates v. State, 556 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Junior Leroy Hillard v. State, 819 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Morris v. State, 910 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)