MELDON RICH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Meldon Rich, serving life sentences for first-degree felony murder and sexual battery, appealed the denial of his emergency habeas corpus petition claiming he was convicted of a non-existent crime because the victim was allegedly dead when the sexual battery occurred. The appellate court affirmed the denial, finding the petition was procedurally defective and that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that sexual battery occurred while the victim was alive.
The court affirmed the denial of habeas relief on multiple grounds: (1) the petition was procedurally improper as it should have been filed in Hamilton County where Rich was incarcerated, not Escambia County; (2) if treated as a rule 3.850 motion, it would be impermissibly successive and untimely; and (3) the merits were without error because ample evidence supported the jury's finding that sexual battery commenced while the victim was alive, as this was a fact question for the jury to decide.
[1] A petition for a writ of habeas corpus generally may not be used to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence; such challenges must be raised in a motion filed under r…
[2] A motion for post-conviction relief under rule 3.850 is impermissible as successive if prior relief has already been sought under that rule.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A petition for a writ of habeas corpus generally may not be used to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence. Instead, a collateral challenge to a judgment of conviction and sentence must be raised in a motion filed under rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and not in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”
Establishes the fundamental procedural requirement that challenges to convictions must use rule 3.850 motions, not habeas petitions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRich is serving concurrent life sentences following his 1990s conviction for first-degree felony murder and sexual battery with physical force. His co…
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Meldon Rich appeals the denial of a petition styled “Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” We affirm.
Rich is serving two concurrent terms of life imprisonment following his conviction for first degree felony murder and sexual battery with physical force. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court. Rich v. State, 791 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
Rich filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Escambia County on September 22, 2008.1 A petition for a writ of habeas corpus generally may not be used to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence. Instead, a collateral challenge to a judgment of conviction and sentence must be raised in a motion filed under rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and not in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004). Rich has already sought relief pursuant to rule 3.850, and the merits of this petition were considered by a circuit court. Thus, even if the habeas petition were treated as a motion under rule 3.850, it would be impermissible as successive, Hutto v. State, 981 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), and as untimely, since Rich’s convictions for murder and sexual battery became final in 2001. Rule 3.850(b) (imposing a two-year window of time to file a motion for post-conviction relief in a non-capital case).
Rich claims in his petition that he was convicted of a non-existent crime, and hence, fundamental error occurred. More particularly, Rich claims that because the prosecution argued that Rich strangled the victim to death and then sexually battered her, the prosecution did not prove sexual battery. Sexual battery cannot be committed on a deceased person. Jones v. State, 569 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 1990); Owen v. State, 560 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1990), vacated on other grounds, State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715 (Fla.1997). The cir*844cuit court, in denying habeas relief, held that ample evidence was presented below which would allow the jury to find that the sexual battery commenced while the victim was alive. Indeed, Rich claimed at trial that the sexual encounter was consensual. The issue of whether the victim was dead or alive at the time of sexual union is an issue of fact to be determined by the jury. Davis v. State, 70S So.2d 1055 (Fla.1997). We find no error in the circuit court’s ruling or reasoning.
AFFIRMED.
WOLF, KAHN, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2004)
- State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997)
- Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990)
- Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990)
- Heard v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 811 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Rogers v. State, 981 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)