REMINGTON FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
ANCHORS AWEIGH MARINE, INC., APPELLEE
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Trial court erred in modifying arbitration venue from Arizona to Florida where the arbitration clause clearly specified Arizona and the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration agreements as written.
A trial court cannot unilaterally modify an arbitration clause's venue provision when the clause is not unconscionable and the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration agreements as written.
[1] A trial court must enforce an arbitration clause according to its terms as required by the Federal Arbitration Act and cannot unilaterally modify venue provisions absent…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnchors Aweigh Marine sued Remington Financial Group for fraud and FDUTPA violations under a consulting agreement containing an arbitration clause spe…
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Appellee, Anchors Aweigh Marine, Inc., sued appellant, Remington Financial Group, Inc., alleging fraud and violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) in connection with their consulting agreement. Appellant moved to compel arbitration and stay the case pending arbitration. The trial court granted the motion but ordered that the arbitration occur in Florida, instead of Arizona, although the arbitration clause provided for arbitration in Arizona and appellee did not move to strike the venue provision. Appellant seeks reversal of the portion of the order requiring that arbitration take place in Florida.
We agree with appellant that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, controls over the arbitration clause at issue in the case and that the trial judge erred in unilaterally changing a portion of the arbitration provision. See BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee, 970 So.2d 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding that trial court was required to enforce arbitration clause as it was written since it was not unconscionable as a whole). We affirm the portion of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration in lieu of litigation, but reverse the portion of the order requiring arbitration in Florida.
Affirmed in pari, Reversed in part, and Remanded.
MAY and LEVINE, JJ., concur.