MARIUS D. SLOAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2009-05-06
No. 2D07-5545
DAVIS, KELLY, and VILLANTI, JJ„ Concur.
10 So. 3d 686 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2009) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Marius Sloan appealed a postconviction order denying his motion to correct what he claimed was an illegal sentence. Sloan was convicted of misdemeanor battery and assault and received probation sentences with jail time as a condition. The court rejected both of his arguments that the sentences exceeded statutory maximums, holding that probation with jail time as a condition does not constitute an illegal sentence.


Holding

The court held that both sentences were legal. A second-degree misdemeanor defendant may be placed on probation for six months with jail time as a condition, which does not violate the sixty-day maximum imprisonment provision. Additionally, a probation sentence with jail time as a special condition does not constitute an illegal split sentence and does not exceed the statutory maximum when the jail time is imposed as a condition of probation rather than as a separate consecutive sentence.


Headnotes

[1] A sentence of six months' probation for a second-degree misdemeanor is permissible, even with a condition of sixty days' jail residence.

[2] A sentence of one year's probation with a special condition of jail residence does not exceed the statutory maximum for a first-degree misdemeanor.

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Key Quotes

“[QUOTE REDACTED — failed verbatim audit (paraphrase, not verbatim). See original_text for the text as originally displayed.]”

Establishes the legal standard that probation for six months with jail time as a condition does not violate the sixty-day maximum for second-degree misdemeanors.

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Facts & Procedural History

Sloan was charged with burglary with assault or battery and misdemeanor battery. A jury convicted him of the lesser-included misdemeanor offenses of b…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Marius Sloan challenges the order of the postconviction court summarily denying his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The State charged Sloan with burglary with an assault or battery and misdemeanor battery, and a jury convicted him of the lesser-included misdemeanor offenses of battery and assault. The trial court placed Sloan on twelve months’ probation on the battery conviction, with 320 days’ specified residence in the county jail as a condition of probation, and six months’ probation on the assault conviction, with sixty days’ specified resi*687dence in the county jail as a condition of probation. The probationary sentences were to run consecutively, but the 320 days and sixty days of specified residence in the county jail were to run concurrently. The trial court awarded Sloan 259 days of jail credit for the time he spent in jail prior to trial.

Sloan’s rule 3.800(a) motion raises two claims. First, he contends that his sentence of six months’ probation on count two exceeds the statutory maximum for a second-degree misdemeanor. He contends that a second-degree misdemeanor is punishable only by a term of imprisonment not exceeding sixty days. A defendant who is convicted of a second-degree misdemeanor may either be placed on probation for six months or may be sentenced to a maximum of sixty days in jail. Smith v. State, 484 So.2d 581 (Fla.1986). The trial court placed Sloan on probation for six months with a condition that he reside for sixty days in the county jail. Such a sentence is permissible. Id. at 582.

Sloan next contends that his sentence for battery is an illegal split sentence because the 320 days in jail combined with the twelve months on probation exceed the one-year statutory maximum for a first-degree misdemeanor. Sloan misapprehends the nature of his sentence. The trial court did not sentence him to 320 days in the county jail followed by one year on probation, but rather sentenced him to one year on probation with a special condition that he spend 320 days in jail. Accordingly, his sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum of one year.

Affirmed.

DAVIS, KELLY, and VILLANTI, JJ„ Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Shawntavian Tucker v. State, 174 So. 3d 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
    …argues that because driving while license suspended or revoked is a second-degree misdemeanor, he could be sentenced on that count to only a term of six months of probation or less. See §§ 322.34(2)(a), 948.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2012); Sloan v. State, 10 So. 3d 686, 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Smith v. State, 484 So. 2d 581, 583 (Fla.1986). We agree with the trial court that this issue is not cognizable in a rule 3.800(b) motion, because the sentence was a result of a negotiated plea. Thus, the real objection is t…
  • Tluczek v. State, 130 So. 3d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
    …tat. (2011). Generally, under the sentencing options for adults, "[a] defendant who is convicted of a second-degree misdemeanor may either be placed on probation for six months or may be sentenced to a maximum of sixty days in jail.” Sloan v. State, 10 So. 3d 686, 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (relying on Smith v. State, 484 So. 2d 581 (Fla.1986)); see also § 948.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). However, there appear to be exceptions to these general rules. See, e.g., § 775.0837, Fla. Stat. (2011) (concerning habitual mis…

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