JONATHAN NODAL, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A trial court errs in denying a defendant's motion to appoint an expert neuropsychologist to examine and testify on the insanity defense when the State has retained a similar expert.
[1] A trial court errs in denying a defendant's motion to appoint an expert neuropsychologist to examine and testify regarding the insanity defense when the State has retaine…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was convicted after a jury trial in a double homicide case in which insanity was the sole arguable defense. The trial court denied the d…
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The defendant appeals from convictions after a jury trial in a horrible and tragic double homicide case in which the sole arguable defense was insanity. Under the circumstances, which are almost identical to those in Dingle v. State, 654 So.2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), it is clear that, as also in Dingle, the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to appoint an expert neuropsyehologist to examine and testify on behalf of the defendant to counter the damaging testimony of a similar expert retained by the State. On the authority of Dingle, the judgment is reversed for further proceedings consistent herewith.1,2
Reversed and remanded.
RAMIREZ, J., concurs.
(concurring).
I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse and remand Jonathan Nodal’s (“the defendant”) conviction and sentence for two counts of first degree murder. I write, however, to clarify the issue of the defendant’s legal representation.
Here, the defendant retained private counsel. Before trial, he wanted to discharge his attorney. The trial court, however, did not allow the defendant to discharge his attorney.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that states are permitted to insist upon representation by counsel for those who are competent enough to stand trial but who still suffer from severe mental illness so they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings themselves. See Indiana v. Edwards, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 2387-88, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008). Therefore, the trial judge was correct to insist that the defendant have representation.
However, as the majority mentions in footnote two, the defendant has an unqualified right to discharge his privately retained counsel. See Branch v. State, 952 So.2d 470, 484 (Fla.2006); Fratcher v. State, 842 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). See also Jackson v. State, 979 So.2d 442 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Therefore, if the defendant again requests to discharge his privately retained counsel, the trial judge should honor his request. If however, the defendant is still competent to stand trial, but not competent to represent himself, the trial judge can give the defendant an opportunity to retain different counsel or appoint counsel to represent him. Branch, 952 So.2d at 484.
GERSTEN, C.J.
(concurring).
I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse and remand Jonathan Nodal’s (“the defendant”) conviction and sentence for two counts of first degree murder. I write, however, to clarify the issue of the defendant’s legal representation.
Here, the defendant retained private counsel. Before trial, he wanted to discharge his attorney. The trial court, however, did not allow the defendant to discharge his attorney.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that states are permitted to insist upon representation by counsel for those who are competent enough to stand trial but who still suffer from severe mental illness so they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings themselves. See Indiana v. Edwards, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 2387-88, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008). Therefore, the trial judge was correct to insist that the defendant have representation.
However, as the majority mentions in footnote two, the defendant has an unqualified right to discharge his privately retained counsel. See Branch v. State, 952 So. 2d 470, 484 (Fla.2006); Fratcher v. State, 842 So. 2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). See also Jackson v. State, 979 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Therefore, if the defendant again requests to discharge his privately retained counsel, the trial judge should honor his request. If however, the defendant is still competent to stand trial, but not competent to represent himself, the trial judge can give the defendant an opportunity to retain different counsel or appoint counsel to represent him. Branch, 952 So. 2d at 484.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (U.S. 2008)
- Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1983)
- Foster v. State, 704 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Branch v. State, 952 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2006)
- Jackson v. State, 979 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
- Fratcher v. State, 842 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Dingle v. State, 654 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)