ERVIN A. HIGGS, ETC., APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM LEO WARRICK, ETC., APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2008-11-12
No. 3D08-564
Before GERSTEN, C.J., RAMIREZ, J., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
994 So. 2d 492 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2008)

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Synopsis

A property appraiser appealed a trial court's grant of homestead exemption to a homeowner who placed his residence in a trust and later transferred it to heirs while retaining a 99-year lease. The court affirmed, holding that under Florida's plain language statutes, a lessee with a 98+ year leasehold interest in a residential property where he resides qualifies for homestead exemption.


Holding

A lessee owning a leasehold interest in a residential parcel with an original term of 98 years or more, who resides thereon, qualifies for homestead exemption under the plain language of Florida Statutes sections 196.031 and 196.041. Therefore, the homeowner's homestead exemption claim should be granted.


Headnotes

[1] A person who holds a leasehold interest in a residential parcel under a bona fide lease with an original term of 98 years or more, and who occupies the parcel as their pe…

[2] Homestead exemption statutes are interpreted by first examining the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language.

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Key Quotes

“courts interpret statutes by first looking to the actual language of the statute, and reading that language for its plain and ordinary meaning”

Establishes the interpretive methodology the court applies to Florida's homestead exemption statutes

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Facts & Procedural History

The homeowner created a trust using his Monroe County residence as the res and continued to reside there. He obtained homestead exemption as trustee. …

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Opinion of the Court
GERSTEN, C.J.

GERSTEN, C.J.

Ervin A. Higgs, property appraiser for Monroe County, Florida (“the property appraiser”), appeals from an adverse summary final judgment in favor of William Leo Warrick (“the homeowner”). We affirm.

The homeowner created a trust using his single family Monroe County residence as the res. After the homeowner placed his home in the trust, he continued to reside in the home. Thereafter, the homeowner, as trustee, applied for and received homestead exemption on the property. Subsequently, the homeowner transferred the trust to his heirs in exchange for a ninety-nine-year lease on the property. Following this transfer, although he continued to reside in the home, the property appraiser denied the homeowner his homestead exemption.

The homeowner, pursuant to his administrative right, petitioned the Value Adjustment Board (“VAB”) for his homestead exemption. After the VAB granted the homeowner the homestead exemption, the property appraiser challenged the VAB’s ruling in the circuit court. The circuit court entered final summary judgment in favor of the homeowner, and the property appraiser appealed.

On appeal, the property appraiser contends that the VAB misinterpreted the applicable homestead exemption statutes. The homeowner, however, asserts that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment based upon the homestead statutes. We agree with the homeowner. At the outset, courts interpret statutes by first looking to the actual language of the statute, and reading that language for its plain and ordinary meaning. See e.g., Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226 (Fla.2006). Here, the pertinent statutes are sections 196.031 and 196.041, Florida Statutes (2005).

Section 196.031 provides a homestead exemption to [ejvery person who ... has the legal or beneficial title in equity to real property in this state and who resides thereon and in good faith makes the same his or her permanent residence. Section 196.041 states that lessees owning the leasehold interest in a bona fide lease having an original term of 98 years or more in a residential parcel ... shall be deemed to have legal or beneficial and equitable title to said property.

The plain and ordinary meaning of sections 196.031 and 196.041 clearly provides that a 98-year-plus lessee of a residential parcel permanently occupied as a residence qualifies for a homestead exemption. Therefore, both the VAB and the trial court correctly determined that the homeowner should receive a homestead exemption.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below. To the extent our ruling conflicts with Prewitt Management Corp. v. Nikolits, 795 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), we certify conflict.

Affirmed.


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