DUPHESIO THOMAS AND RANDELL R. COLSTON, APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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Two defendants appealed their armed robbery convictions, raising four issues, all without merit. The State cross-appealed the trial court's grant of judgment of acquittal on the second armed robbery count, arguing sufficient evidence existed that the victim was put in fear. The appellate court agreed with the State and reversed the acquittal.
The court held that the trial court erred in granting judgment of acquittal on Count II. The relevant standard is whether the circumstances surrounding the incident would cause a reasonable person to be afraid, not whether the victim was actually afraid. Because the facts testified to by the Count I victim would cause a reasonable person to be afraid, and the jury found guilt, the judgment of acquittal was improper and the jury verdict should be reinstated.
[1] In determining whether a victim was put in fear in the course of a taking, the question is whether the circumstances surrounding the incident would cause a reasonable per…
[2] A conviction for armed robbery may be sustained even if the victim of the specific count did not testify, provided the circumstances would cause a reasonable person to be…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In determining whether a victim was put in fear in the course of a taking, the question is whether the circumstances surrounding the incident would cause a reasonable person to be afraid, not whether the victim was actually afraid.”
Establishes the objective legal standard for armed robbery requiring fear—a reasonable person standard rather than actual victim fear.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants Thomas and Colston were charged with two counts of armed robbery. The trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on Count II, r…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Duphesio Thomas and Randell R. Colston, appeal their judgments and sentences and raise four issues on appeal, none of which have merit. The State argues on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in granting Appellants/Cross-Appellees’ motion for judgment of acquittal following the jury’s verdict of guilt on Count II, the second of two armed robbery counts, on the basis that there was no evidence in the record that the victim identified in Count II was put in fear in the course of the taking. We agree.
In determining whether a victim was put in fear in the course of a taking, the question is whether the circumstances surrounding the incident would cause a reasonable person to be afraid, not whether the victim was actually afraid. See Cliett v. State, 951 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Magnotti v. State, 842 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Woods v. State, 769 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); State v. Baldwin, 709 So. 2d 636, 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
The facts surrounding the offenses at issue, as testified to by the victim identified in Count I, would cause, as the jury found, a reasonable person to be afraid. As such, it matters not that the victim identified in Count II did not testify. See Johnson v. State, 888 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that the fact that the victim of the aggravated assault did not testify and, thus, could not describe or articulate any fear did not bar a conviction because the jury could find that a reasonable person under the circumstances present in the case would be afraid and that the victim was, in fact, in fear); L.R.W. v. State, 848 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (noting that the victim did not testify but holding that the trial court could conclude that the appellant’s actions would put a reasonable person in fear); McClain v. State, 383 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (holding that there was no requirement that a victim in an assault actually testify as to his or her own state of mind with respect to whether or not he or she was afraid).
Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdict on Count II.
DAVIS, PADOVANO, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
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Delgado v. State, 105 So. 3d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…rson, under like circumstances, would have felt sufficiently threatened to accede to the robber’s demands.” Magnotti v. State, 842 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also Bryant v. State, 30 So. 3d 591, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Thomas v. State, 989 So. 2d 735, 736 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); State v. Hawkins, 790 So. 2d 492, 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Handbook on Criminal Law § 94, p. 700 (1972) (recognizing that Florida follows the rule “that the threat of harm, for robber…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rogers v. Marko, 383 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- L.R.W. A Child v. State, 848 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- State v. Baldwin, 709 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Magnotti v. State, 842 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Johnson v. State, 888 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Woods v. State, 769 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- SC.READ, Inc. v. Seminole Cnty. Sch. Bd., 951 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)
- Cliett v. State, 951 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)