YEVGENIY GASILOVSKY, APPELLANT,
v.
JULIE BEN-SHIMOL, ETC., APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2008-04-23
No. 3D07-1924
Before GERSTEN, C.J., and RAMIREZ and CORTINAS, JJ.
979 So. 2d 1179 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2008) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

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Holding

A temporary injunction for repeat violence requires proof of at least two separate incidents of violence or stalking, not multiple acts from a single incident.


Facts & Procedural History

The trial court granted a temporary injunction for repeat violence based on three acts stemming from a single violent incident.…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Yevgeniy Gasilovsky (“Gasilovsky”) appeals a temporary injunction for protection against repeat violence pursuant to section 784.046, Florida Statutes (2006). We reverse.

To enter an injunction for “repeat violence,” a trial court must find that the respondent committed at least two incidents of violence or stalking. § 784.046(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006); see also Terrell v. Thompson, 935 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). One of these acts must have been committed within six months of filing a petition for protection from repeat violence. Further, each act of violence and/or stalking must be proven by competent substantial evidence. Smith v. Melcher, 975 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

A finding of only one incident of violence does not constitute “repeat violence” under section 784.046, Florida Statutes. Darrow v. Moschella, 805 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Here, the trial judge based his findings solely on three acts stemming from a single violent incident. These acts were not separated by time or distance. Thus, the trial court’s ruling does not support a finding of the two incidents of violence and/or stalking necessary to constitute repeat violence under the statute.

Accordingly, we reverse the temporary injunction for protection against repeat violence.

Reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the temporary injunction.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Levy v. Jacobs, 69 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
    …Aresty, 994 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Multiple acts stemming from a single violent incident do not constitute “repeat violence” under section 784.046 where those acts were not separated by time or distance. See Gasilovsky v. Ben-Shimol, 979 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“Here, the trial judge based his findings solely on three acts stemming from a single violent incident. These acts were not separated by time or distance. Thus, the trial court’s ruling does not support a finding of the two…
  • Ostrow v. Laurie Imler o/b/o D.I., 27 So. 3d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)
    …ment of injunction for sexual violence, the court must find an act of sexual violence occurred, just as the court must find that two acts of violence occurred in order to secure an injunction for repeat violence. See, e.g., Gasilovsky v. Ben-Shimol, 979 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Each act must be proved by competent substantial evidence. Id. See also Sorin v. Cole, 929 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Section 800.04 prohibits lewd and lascivious acts. Only one section could apply to the facts of this cas…
  • …ction against repeat violence must be based upon two separate incidents of violence. See § 784.046(1)(b), Fla. Stat. “A finding of only one incident of violence does not constitute ‘repeat violence’ under section 784.046.” Gasilovsky v. Ben-Shimol, 979 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). We review an order granting an injunction against repeat violence “to determine whether each alleged act of violence is founded upon competent, substantial evidence.” Shocki, 994 So. 2d at 1132; see also Smith v. Melcher,…

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