ESCAMBIA COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
U.I.L. FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, A FLORIDA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, AND C.C. FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, A FLORIDA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 2008-03-25
No. 1D07-1836
ALLEN, DAVIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
977 So. 2d 716 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2008) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

Escambia County appeals an attorney's fees award to real estate developers who prevailed in a declaratory and injunctive relief action against the County. The court affirms the award, holding that section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, entitles the prevailing developers to reciprocal attorney's fees under the contract's fee provision.


Holding

The Developers are entitled to reciprocal attorney's fees under section 57.105(5) because the contract's attorney's fees provision contemplated a lawsuit in which parties would litigate their rights and obligations under the guarantees, and the Developers' declaratory action differed from the action envisioned in the contract only with respect to which party filed suit.


Headnotes

[1] A contract provision allowing attorney's fees to a party enforcing the contract permits the other party to recover attorney's fees when they prevail in an action related…

[2] Reciprocity of attorney's fees under section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, is limited to the specific terms of the contractual attorney's fees provision.

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Key Quotes

“If a contract contains a provision allowing attorney's fees to a party when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney's fees to the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract.”

Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, establishing the reciprocal attorney's fees doctrine that governs the case.

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Facts & Procedural History

The Developers and County entered into a contract containing an attorney's fees provision stating that if the County had to file judicial action to en…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Escambia County (“County”), appeals a final order awarding attorney’s fees to Appellees, real estate developers (“Developers”), who prevailed in an action against the County for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Developers filed the action asserting that they were entitled to valid building permits under their contract with the County. The County does not challenge the trial court’s order granting relief to the Developers, but only the subsequent order granting attorney’s fees under section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes (2001). Because we find that the County’s entitlement to fees is reciprocal under the contract, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the Developers are entitled to attorney’s fees for prevailing in their declaratory action.

Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2001), provides in relevant part:

If a contract contains a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract.

(Emphasis added.) This reciprocity is limited to the specific terms of the attorney’s fees provision in a contract. Subway Restaurants, Inc. v. Thomas, 860 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that a tenant was riot entitled to attorney’s fees for lawsuit for wrongful eviction and breach of contract because the attorney’s fees provision of the lease only applied to rent collection actions); Anderson Columbia Co., Inc., v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 744 So. 2d 1206, 1207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding that contractor was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees under reciprocal fee statute where the contract provided for attorney’s fees if the Department sued contractor on the bond and the suit at issue was for breach of contract).

The parties entered into á contract which contains the following attorney’s fees provision: “If County ever has to file a judicial action to enforce any provision of this guarantee, then [Developers] agree to reimburse County for all of its costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees through appeal, if necessary, that it may have incurred in enforcing this guarantee.” By its plain language, this fee provision envisions a lawsuit in which the parties litigate their rights and obligations under the guarantees, which would inevitably result in a judicial construction of the contract language. The declaratory action brought by the Developers differs from the action envisioned in the contract only with respect to who sat on each side of the courtroom.

In its order • granting declaratory and injunctive relief, the trial court found that the County denied building permits as a result of the County’s reliance on the guarantees, which were found to be unenforceable. Based on this finding, the County effectively forced the Developers to seek a judicial clarification of their .right to resolve a legal conflict, after the County acted to the Developers’ detriment, as issuer of permits and regulator of land development. Jakobi v. Kings Creek Vill. Townhouse Ass’n, Inc., 665 So. 2d 325, 327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (noting that because homeowners’ association had “arbitrarily refus[ed] to approve owner’s plans where similar structures had been approved before, the Association forced the owner to file suit.”). We find no basis to conclude that the Developers’ lawsuit, even though it sought declaratory and injunctive relief, so differed from the enforcement action envisioned in the guarantees that section 57.105 would not apply to award the Developers reciprocal attorney’s fees.

Therefore, we AFFIRM the trial court’s determination that the Developers are entitled to attorney’s fees. We affirm the amount of fees awarded, which reflects a reasonable exercise of the trial court’s discretion.

ALLEN, DAVIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …f attorney’s fees, the reciprocity provision of section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes (2005), cannot function to authorize Cross to recover such fees that are not authorized for Bayview in the contract. See Escambia Cty. v. U.I.L. Family Ltd. P’ship, 977 So. 2d 716, 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) 4 (holding that the reciprocity provision of section 57.105 “is limited to the specific terms of the attorney’s fees provision in a contract” (citing Subway Rests., Inc. v. Thomas, 860 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); An…
  • Portfolio Recovery v. Benjamin (9th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2016)
    …s not a salaried employee, the attorney’s fee provision in the contract applies. Section 57.105(7) applies because the action to collect the debt was “with respect to” the credit card agreement. In Escambia County v. U.I.L. Family Ltd. Partnership, 977 So. 2d 716, 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), the attorney’s fee provision in the contract stated that the county could recover attorney’s fees if it had to file suit to enforce the guarantee. The court held that section 57.105(5)1 applied to permit an award of attorne…
  • N. Am. Clearing, Inc. v. Brokerage Computer Sys., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2010)
    …contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract. See, e.g., Escambia County v. U.I.L. Family Ltd. P’ship, 977 So.2d 716, 716-17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Lanahan Lumber Co. v. McDevitt & Street Co., 611 So.2d 591, 592 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Because Goble is not a party to the contract, Florida’s reciprocity statute does not apply. Accordingly, Goble should not be…

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