DARIN LEE WALDO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Darin Lee Waldo was convicted after a jury trial, but his convictions must be reversed because evidence used against him resulted from an unlawful warrantless search of the side and backyard of his home. Although officers lawfully approached the front door, their warrantless entry into the more private side and backyard areas constituted an unlawful search, and the observations made there could not be used to support a search warrant for the house.
The convictions are reversed because the officers' warrantless entry into the side and backyard areas was an unlawful search, and observations made during that unlawful search cannot be used to obtain a warrant for a further search of the property. The good faith doctrine does not apply when officers have engaged in initial unlawful conduct.
[1] A warrantless and uninvited entry into the side and backyard areas of a home constitutes an unlawful search, as these areas are constitutionally protected.
[2] Evidence observed during an unlawful search of a yard cannot be used to obtain a search warrant for the property or house.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“while there was no violation of the appellant's privacy rights when the officers first went to the front door where visitors might be expected, the side and backyard areas are more private and are constitutionally protected.”
Establishes that the front door approach is lawful but side and backyard areas receive Fourth Amendment protection
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter receiving a tip about criminal activity, sheriff's officers went to Waldo's home and knocked on the front door. When no one answered, the office…
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ALLEN, J.
The appellant challenges convictions entered upon jury verdicts at a trial after the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Despite the appellant’s assertion that the court should have entered a judgment of acquittal, there was sufficient evidence at trial to submit the case to the jury. But because some of the evidence resulted from an unlawful search and should have been suppressed, the convictions must be reversed.
At a hearing on the motion to suppress it was established that after receiving a tip about criminal activity, sheriffs officers went to the appellant’s home and knocked on the front door. When nobody answered the knock at that door, officers went to the side and back of the house and tried to get the occupants to respond at those locations. During this foray into the side and back yard, the officers observed incriminating evidence in the yard. An affidavit for a search warrant was prepared, with a description of those observations. A search warrant issued, and on a subsequent search of the house officers found additional incriminating evidence.
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court indicated that the officers had a legitimate and lawful reason to be on the property.
However, while there was no violation of the appellant’s privacy rights when the officers first went to the front door where visitors might be expected, the side and backyard areas are more private and are constitutionally protected. See State v. Morsman, 394 So. 2d 408 (Fla.1981); Maggard v. State, 736 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). As Morsman and Maggard indicate, the officers’ uninvited and warrantless entry into the side and backyard areas was an unlawful search. And because the officers’ observations during the unlawful search may not be used to obtain a warrant for a further search of the property and the house, see Morsman, the evidence resulting from the searches should have been suppressed.
The state argues that the evidence may be received under the good faith doctrine announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).
But although a warrant was obtained before the officers entered the house, the officers had already made an unlawful search of the yard outside the house and the warrant was based on the officers’ observations during that unlawful search. The good faith doctrine as approved in Leon contemplates that the law enforcement agents have not acted improperly, and are otherwise entitled to reasonably rely on a judicial determination of probable cause in the issuance of a warrant. The notion that good faith cannot be claimed in connection with law enforcement error or negligence is confirmed in cases such as State v. White, 660 So. 2d 664 (Fla.1995), and Shadier v. State, 761 So. 2d 279 (Fla.2000).
In the present case there is no basis for an assertion of good faith, in light of the officers’ initial misconduct.
The appellant’s convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded.
POLSTON, J., concurs, and WOLF, J., concurs with opinion.
WOLF, J.,
Concurring.
If all of the trial judge’s factual findings were supported by the record, I would affirm. Several critical determinations concerning the character of the area, as well as normal customs of people in this community, are not supported by evidence on the record. These determinations would be pertinent to appellant’s reasonable expectation of privacy as well as the reasonableness of the officers’ actions. I, therefore, agree with the majority’s conclusion to reverse the denial of the motion to. suppress.
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Citator
Cited By
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Powell v. State, 120 So. 3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…dwelling on a defined path, knock on the front door, briefly await an answer, and either engage in a consensual encounter with the resident or immediately depart. See, e.g., Nieminski v. State, 60 So. 3d 521, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Waldo v. State, 975 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). A resident has the option to either open the door or refuse to do so. Kentucky v. King, - U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1862, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (whether knock is by “police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has n…1 / 2
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Lollie v. State, 14 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…the incursion into his back yard, both before and after the warrant was obtained, arguing that the warrantless entry into the backyard area was an unlawful search. This case is strikingly similar to the factual scenario addressed in Waldo v. State, 975 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). In that case this court confirmed that, in accordance with the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Morsman, 394 So. 2d 408 (Fla.1981), the officers were entitled to approach the front door of the residence, but the warr…
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Glover Fred Calloway v. State, 118 So. 3d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)…er, and either engage in a consensual encounter with the resident or immediately depart.” Powell v. State, 2013 WL 2232319, 120 So. 3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA May 22, 2013) (citing Nieminski v. State, 60 So. 3d 521, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Waldo v. State, 975 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). Given the consensual nature of the contact, of course, a resident is supposed to have the option of refusing to open the door. Kentucky v. King, — U.S.-,-, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1862, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (whether knock is by…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (U.S. 1984)
- State v. Morsman, 394 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. White, 660 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1995)
- Int'l Marine Co-Op, Ltd. v. Centro Nautico Representacoes Nauticas, 761 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1999)
- Shadler v. State, 761 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2000)
- Maggard v. State, 736 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)