EUGENIA AUSTIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eugenia Austin appealed the trial court's denial of her Rule 3.850 post-conviction relief motion, raising two claims regarding her 35-year sentence as a habitual offender and Prison Releasee Reoffender, and allegations that her trial counsel's promise to 'get you off' led to an involuntary decision to proceed to trial. The appellate court affirmed, finding the sentence legal and the ineffective assistance claim insufficiently pleaded.
The 35-year sentence is legal because it constitutes a single sentence representing the greater habitual offender enhancement rather than consecutive PRR and habitual offender sentences, and the ineffective assistance claim is insufficiently pleaded because the defendant failed to allege that a plea offer was made or that counsel advised her to reject one.
[1] A contention not raised in a brief on appeal is deemed abandoned.
[2] A sentence may be enhanced as both a Prison Releasee Reoffender and a habitual offender for a single offense, provided the habitual offender sentence is greater than the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the defendant's habitual offender sentence is greater than the maximum PRR sentence, the sentence is not illegal.”
Establishes the legal standard for imposing combined PRR and habitual offender enhancements on a single sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEugenia Austin was convicted and sentenced to 35 years as both a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) and a habitual offender. She claimed her trial couns…
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PALMER, C.J.
Eugenia Austin (defendant) appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm.
The defendant has filed a brief claiming error by the trial court as to only two of the several claims set forth in her rule 3.850 motion. Accordingly, any contention that the trial court erred in denying the remaining claims has been abandoned. See Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235 (Fla.2003). As to the remaining two claims, we find no error. In that regard, the defendant first claims that her sentence as both a habitual offender and a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) is illegal because the PRR sentence is greater than the habitual offender sentence. Specifically, the defendant argues that her sentence includes a 30-year PRR sentence and a consecutive 5-year habitual offender sentence. She is incorrect. The defendant’s sentence is a single 35-year sentence as both a PRR and a habitual offender. The maximum PRR sentence on her conviction is 30 years. Therefore, the 35-year sentence represents the greater habitual offender sentence.1 In State v. Manning, 839 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), this court held that courts may impose PRR and habitual offender sentence enhancements for a single offense so long as the habitual offender sentence results in a greater sentence. Because the defendant’s habitual offender sentence is greater than the maximum PRR sentence, the sentence is not illegal.
The defendant also contends that her decision to proceed to trial was based on a promise made to her by her trial counsel that she would “get you off the aggravated battery charge, you’ll only get five years.” The defendant argues that her decision to go to trial was involuntary based on this promise. However, the defendant does not allege that a plea offer was ever made to her nor that her trial counsel advised her to reject the plea offer. As such, the defendant’s allegation is insufficient to obtain relief.2
AFFIRMED.
PLEUS and TORPY, JJ., concur. . See § 775.082(9)(a)3-b, 775.082(9)(b) Fla. Stat. (2005).
. Because we find the defendant’s allegations to be insufficient, we need not reach the issue on which the other district courts of appeal are currently split as to whether a trial counsel's assurance of a win at trial, standing alone, constitutes a facially sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if it leads to the defendant’s rejection of a plea offer. See Gomez v. State, 832 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Compare Morgan v. State, 941 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), rev. granted, 956 So. 2d 456 (Fla.2007); Dines v. State, 909 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), rev. dism., 954 So. 2d 27 (Fla.2006); Gonzales v. State, 691 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), rev. denied, 700 So. 2d 685 (Fla.1997).
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Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Ward v. State, 19 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…sible pleading deficiencies, we affirm as to Appellant’s one point on appeal. We have not reviewed the other issues presented to the trial court, however, because Appellant abandoned these issues by not addressing them in his brief. Austin v. State, 968 So. 2d 1049, 1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). We are aware of the intra-district conflict between Austin and Webb v. State, 757 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), on this point. We approve Austin and recede from Webb to the extent of such conflict. AFFIRMED. MONACO,…
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Angus N. Kelley v. State, 109 So. 3d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…ned the other claims in his motion by not raising any issue in his brief regarding the denial of those claims. See Watson v. State, 975 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see also Prince v. State, 40 So. 3d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Austin v. State, 968 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). . Because no evidentiary hearing was held on claim 1, we do not know why counsel did not strike jurors Fowler and Sewell. We note, however, that during the evidentiary hearing on Appellant's other claims, counsel testified that…
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Walton v. State, 58 So. 3d 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…a Spera claim. See Watson, 975 So. 2d at 574-75 (Wolf, J., concurring). Other courts have reached the same result. See Ward v. State, 19 So. 3d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); cf. Hammond v. State, 34 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Austin v. State, 968 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); see also Prince v. State, 40 So. 3d 11, 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (reiterating that a pro se appellant who presents no argument as to why a trial court’s ruling is incorrect on an issue has abandoned the issue). Affirmed. [*889] D…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 2003)
- Owens v. State, 832 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Sycamore v. Fla. Atl. Univ., 691 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Gonzales v. State, 691 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Flores v. State, 954 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 2007)
- Lightbourne v. State, 956 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 2007)
- State v. Manning, 839 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Hampton v. State, 941 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
- Dines v. State, 909 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)