ALANDER CRAPPS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant's PRR sentence was improper because throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19 is not a qualifying offense for PRR classification, requiring reversal and resentencing.
Section 790.19 (throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle) does not qualify as a forcible felony for PRR sentencing purposes because the statute does not necessarily require physical force or violence against an individual.
[1] An offense qualifies as a forcible felony for prison releasee reoffender sentencing only if the statutory elements necessarily require the use or threat of physical force…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the only relevant consideration in determining whether an offense constitutes a forcible felony is the statutory elements of the offense and that if 'the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual' is not a necessary element of the offense, then the offense is not a forcible felony”
State v. Hearns standard for determining forcible felony status
Alander Crapps was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) for violating section 790.19, Florida Statutes, which prohibits throwing a deadly m…
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DAVIS, J.
i
Appellant, Alander Crapps, appeals his judgment and sentence and argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him as a prison releasee reoffender (“PRR”) because, he contends, the offense of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle, as proscribed in section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2005), is not a qualifying offense for PRR classification under section 775.082(9)(a)l.o., Florida Statutes (2005). We agree. See Paul v. State, 958 So. 2d 1135, 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding that the appellant, who was convicted of shooting a deadly missile into a dwelling, did not qualify as a PRR); Hudson v. State, 800 So. 2d 627, 628-29 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that the crime proscribed by section 790.19 is not a forcible felony because it includes shooting or throwing at unoccupied buildings and, thus, does not, by statutory definition, necessarily involve physical force or violence against an individual); see also State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 216 (Fla.2007) (reiterating that the only relevant consideration in determining whether an offense constitutes a forcible felony is the statutory elements of the offense and that if “ ‘the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual’ ” is not a necessary element of the offense, then the offense is not a forcible felony).
Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for resentencing.
ALLEN and BENTON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Paul v. State, 129 So. 3d 1058 (Fla. 2013)…QUINCE, J. We have for review Paul v. State, 59 So. 3d 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), wherein the Fourth District certified conflict with the First District’s decision in Crapps v. State, 968 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The certified conflict involves an issue of statutory construction: whether shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), qualifies for…1 / 2
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Paul v. State, 59 So. 3d 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…Appellant’s PRR sentence is not illegal on this ground because his offense necessarily required the use of force or violence against an individual. We recognize and certify that this decision directly conflicts with the decision in Crapps v. State, 968 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The trial court’s order denying appellant’s postconviction motion is affirmed. WARNER, MAY and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007)
- Peterson Paul v. State, 958 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
- Hudson v. State, 800 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)