TIMOTHY BAILEY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Bailey's motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence, holding that the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and the consent to search was freely and voluntarily given.
An investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion and a freely and voluntarily given written consent to search are sufficient to uphold the denial of a motion to suppress evidence.
[1] A written consent to search is not rendered involuntary merely by the presence of police officers at the scene, provided the consent is otherwise freely and voluntarily g…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a ... consent to search”
The court cited United States v. Watson for the proposition that mere custody does not negate voluntary consent.
Timothy Bailey was stopped in a vehicle and subsequently gave written consent to search his residence, from which evidence was seized.…
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ROTHENBERG, Judge.
The defendant, Timothy Bailey, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from the house where he resided. As we conclude that the investigatory stop of the vehicle Bailey was in was based upon reasonable well-founded suspicion, see Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993), and that the written consent to search obtained from Bailey was freely and voluntarily given, see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)(holding that “custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a ... consent to search”); United States v. Barnett, 989 F. 2d 546, 555-56 (1st Cir.1993)(rejecting defendant’s argument that his consent was not voluntary due to the “strong police presence”), we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bailey’s motion to suppress. See Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 806 (Fla.2002)(“[A] trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness, and the reviewing court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.”)
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2002)
- United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (U.S. 1976)
- Tedd J. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993)
- United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546 (1st Cir. 1993)