CARESSA, INC.
v.
CITY GAS COMPANY OF FLORIDA, INC.

Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. | 1967-10-20
No. 66-L-333
29 Fla. Supp. 199 Dade County Circuit Court (1967)

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Synopsis

City Gas Company of Florida filed a third-party complaint against two subcontractors (Miami Heating & Ventilating Company and Hinds Plumbing Company) seeking indemnification for breach of contract damages. The court dismissed the third-party complaint for failure to allege sufficient facts establishing an indemnity relationship, either by express contract or operation of law.


Holding

The third-party complaint failed to state a legally sufficient cause of action for indemnity because it did not allege sufficient evidentiary facts from which a court could infer either an express contract of indemnity or the operation of law creating an indemnity relationship between the parties.


Key Quotes

“A complaint is legally sufficient if it states ultimate facts which in turn state a cause of action, thus avoiding the prolixity of evidentiary facts. But where the so-called ultimate fact is a mixed question of law and fact, it is impossible to distinguish the ultimate fact (permissible) from a conclusion of law (not permissible). To resolve this dilemma, it becomes necessary to allege sufficient evidentiary facts from which to infer the ultimate fact.”

Establishes the court's standard for pleading sufficiency, requiring evidentiary facts when ultimate facts constitute mixed questions of law and fact.

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Facts & Procedural History

Caressa, Inc. sued City Gas Company of Florida for breach of a written contract. City Gas Company filed a third-party complaint against Miami Heating …

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Opinion of the Court
HENRY L. BALABAN, Circuit Judge.

HENRY L. BALABAN, Circuit Judge.

This cause came on to be heard on third party defendants’ motions to dismiss third party plaintiff’s complaint, and the court having heard argument of counsel for the respective parties, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, finds —

1. The plaintiff, Caressa, Inc., filed a complaint against the defendant, City Gas Company of Florida, alleging breach of written contract entered into between the parties.

2. The defendant, in turn, filed a third party complaint against the two third party defendants in two counts.

In count I it alleges, without more, that Miami Heating & Ventilating Company was a subcontractor of the third party plaintiff, and Hinds Plumbing Company was a subcontractor of Miami Heating & Ventilating Company, which third party defendants allegedly caused (but does not allege how) the breach of contract the original plaintiff complains of, thereby entitling *201the third party plaintiff to be indemnified for any sums that may be adjudged against it.

In count II, after readopting its allegations in count I, the third party plaintiff, without more, concludes it is entitled to full indemnity including reasonable cost of defense of this action.

3. There are no allegations of fact from which to infer that the contract between the plaintiff and the third party plaintiff also binds the third party defendants, which would be the case if they knew about the contract and expressly or by operation of law adopted the contract as their own.

Neither are there allegations of fact from which to infer that in case of a breach of the contract by the third party plaintiff, the third party defendants promised either expressly or by operation of law to indemnify the third party plaintiff.

4. A complaint is legally sufficient if it states ultimate facts which in turn state a cause of action, thus avoiding the prolixity of evidentiary facts.

But where the so-called ultimate fact is a mixed question of law and fact, it is impossible to distinguish the ultimate fact (permissible) from a conclusion of law (not permissible). To resolve this dilemma, it becomes necessary to allege sufficient evidentiary facts from which to infer the ultimate fact.

5. The relationship of indemnitor-indemnitee may arise by express contract or by operation of law and is a mixed question of law and fact. The allegations of the third party plaintiff are legally insufficient to state a cause of action for indemnity, in view of the alleged circumstances, taken as a whole, , surrounding the case.

It is, therefore, upon consideration ordered and adjudged that —

6. The third party defendants’ motions to dismiss the third party plaintiff’s complaint are granted, and the complaint is dismissed, without prejudice.

7. The third party plaintiff is granted twenty days in which to file an amended third party complaint if it desires to do so.


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