MARC BRESSLER, APPELLANT,
v.
EVE BRESSLER, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's requirement that the wife repay $6,430 as her portion of a parental loan, but reversed the requirement that the husband repay the wife for post-separation home repairs since he retained no interest in the property. The court affirmed the award of the marital residence to the wife as reasonable compensation for dissipated assets and unpaid support.
The trial court correctly required the wife to repay $6,430 of the parental loan without interest. However, the requirement that the husband repay the wife for post-separation home repairs was an abuse of discretion since he retained no interest in the property and these were not marital liabilities. The award of the marital residence to the wife was not an abuse of discretion as it reasonably compensated her for unpaid support, dissipated assets, and permanent alimony needs.
[1] A trial court does not err in failing to award interest on a loan when there are disputed facts regarding whether the loan agreement included interest.
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by requiring a party to pay for post-separation repairs to a marital residence awarded to the other party as lump sum alimony and equi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we conclude on this confusing record and argument that the court's final judgment should be affirmed as to the amount the wife is required to repay on a loan, but we reverse in part on the requirement that the husband repay the wife for house repairs made after their separation”
Statement of the court's disposition and the primary issues on appeal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorcing and the trial court distributed assets including the marital residence to the wife as lump sum alimony and equitable distri…
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WARNER, J.
The resolution of this appeal from a final judgment of dissolution is impeded by the fact that neither the final judgment nor the briefs are clear as to the values of the various assets of the parties or their ultimate distribution. We conclude on this confusing record and argument that the court’s final judgment should be affirmed as to the amount the wife is required to repay on a loan, but we reverse in part on the requirement that the husband repay the wife for house repairs made after their separation. In all other respects, we affirm.
First, the husband contends that the wife is responsible for $6,430 as her portion of a loan from the husband’s parents. The final judgment is not clear as to the extent of the wife’s liability, but she concedes that she is liable for $6,430. Therefore, we affirm, interpreting the final judg ment as requiring her to repay that amount to her former in-laws. As to the claim that interest is owed by the wife, the trial court did not include interest based upon disputed facts that the loan did not include interest. The trial court made no error in failing to award interest.
Second, although the wife was awarded the marital residence as lump sum alimony and equitable distribution, the trial court made the husband responsible for one-half of repairs made to the home after separation. Given the distribution made by the trial court, we conclude that this award was an abuse of discretion as these were not marital liabilities, and the husband retained no interest in the property. See § 61.075(6), Fla. Stat. (2002).
Finally, the husband complains that the trial court’s decision to award the wife his interest in the marital residence is entirely inequitable. Because of the husband’s dissipation of other assets during the marriage due to criminal charges against him, we do not conclude that the court abused its discretion in making this lopsided award. Williamson v. Williamson, 367 So. 2d 1016 (Fla.1979). In particular, the award of the house compensated the wife for unpaid support, her share of dissipated assets, and her need for permanent alimony which the husband cannot now pay.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
GUNTHER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Horacio A. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 958 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…reversing award of marital home), Perez v. Perez, 882 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)(same), Jessee v. Jessee, 839 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)(same), and Safferstone v. Safferstone, 501 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)(same), with Bressler v. Bressler, 914 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)(upholding award of marital home), Russell v. Russell, 890 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)(same), Manrique v. Manrique, 786 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(same), and Soll v. Soll, 560 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(same). . The c…
Authorities Cited
- Williamson v. Veva C. Williamson, 367 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1979)