COMMERCIAL CARRIER CORPORATION, ET AL., PETITIONER,
v.
KESTER RAY KELLEY, JR., ET AL., RESPONDENT
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Commercial Carrier Corporation and Linda Sue Faulkner sought certiorari review of a discovery order compelling production of Faulkner's mental health records and allowing depositions of her mental health providers. The trial court found that Faulkner waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege by disclosing her mental health condition in motions to delay her deposition. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that Faulkner's limited disclosures did not constitute a waiver of privilege.
Faulkner did not waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Her limited disclosures—mentioning her condition in deposition motions and admitting to antidepressant use—did not constitute a significant waiver, and no actual communications between Faulkner and her mental health providers were disclosed. Additionally, her mental state was not put in controversy because she never made it a material element of any claim or defense.
[1] A party does not waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege by disclosing that they are being treated for post-traumatic stress disorder and have been prescribed an anti…
[2] Disclosing that a party is being treated by mental health providers for post-traumatic stress disorder following a traffic crash does not place that party's mental state…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The parties agree that the information sought falls under the psychotherapist-patient privilege. However, the trial court accepted Respondent's argument that Faulkner had waived the privilege by voluntarily disclosing significant parts of the privileged matters or communications and compelled production of the otherwise privileged information.”
Establishes the central issue: whether limited disclosures constitute waiver of psychotherapist-patient privilege
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFaulkner was involved in a traffic crash and sought to delay her deposition on two occasions, citing post-traumatic stress disorder treatment by two m…
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PER CURIAM.
Linda Sue Faulkner and Commercial Carrier Corporation seek certiorari review of a non-final order granting Respondent’s motion to compel production of Faulkner’s mental health records, allowing Respondents to depose Faulkner’s mental health providers and requiring Faulkner to answer deposition questions regarding her mental health treatment. The parties agree that the information sought falls under the psychotherapist-patient privilege.1 However, the trial court accepted Respondent’s argument that Faulkner had waived the privilege by voluntarily disclosing significant parts of the privileged matters or communications and compelled production of the otherwise privileged information.2 We disagree and quash the order on review.
On two occasions, Faulkner sought to delay her deposition. As good cause for that delay, she explained in her motions that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, which was being treated with two mental health care providers, following an admittedly horrific traffic crash. Attached to those motions were letters from one of the mental health providers substantiating her assertions. Contrary to the position advocated by Respondents, this did not put her mental state in controversy. Faulkner never made her mental state a material element of any claim or defense. Nor do we believe that Faulkner’s motions, or her admission at deposition that she had been prescribed an antidepressant, constitute a waiver of the privilege. Certainly no communication between Faulkner and her mental health providers was disclosed, and we do not believe that the limited disclosure made was in any way significant. Accordingly, we issue the writ and quash the order on review.
CERTIORARI GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED.
PETERSON, ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur. . § 90.503, Fla. Stat. (2004).
. § 90.507, Fla. Stat. (2004).
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