H. J. MCLEOD, APPELLANT,
v.
BUELL CARR ET AL., APPELLEES
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McLeod sought to enjoin the City of Panama City's vacation of two streets (Nelson Street and an unnamed street), arguing that the closure violated his property rights by obstructing ingress and egress. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's summary judgment dismissing his claim, holding that cities have statutory authority to discontinue streets and McLeod failed to demonstrate a violation of his personal or property rights.
The City of Panama City had statutory authority under section 167.09, F.S. 1955 to discontinue the streets, and McLeod failed to show that the exercise of this power constituted a wrongful invasion of any personal or property right. Church Street provided adequate means of ingress and egress despite not being formally dedicated for public use.
“The cities of this State are authorized by section-167.09, F.S.1955, F.S.A. to discontinue any street and the plaintiff has not shown that the exercise of the power by the city in this instance constitutes a wrongful invasion of any personal or property right of the plaintiff.”
Establishes the statutory basis for the city's authority to vacate streets and the standard for challenging that authority.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Panama City passed an ordinance relinquishing and abandoning its easement for Nelson Street and an unnamed street. McLeod brought an equit…
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BARNS, Justice.
The intervening defendant, City of Panama City, passed an ordinance relinquishing and abandoning its easement for street purposes of Nelson Street and an unnamed street, whereupon appellant brought suit in equity against the fee owner seeking a decree enjoining the obstruction of the street by the defendant-appellee on the grounds of invalidity of the ordinance. The defendant answered and upon motion for summary judgment a final decree was rendered and plaintiff appealed.
The principal ground for relief by injunction was that if Nelson Street was vacated that appellant would have no means of ingress and egress except over Church Street, which had not been “dedicated for public use”; that if the unnamed street was closed the appellant would be required to travel an additional half-mile en-route to and from work; and that the closing of the streets was for a private use, and not a public purpose, the purpose being to enable the'defendant American Oil Company to use the land to expand its oil plant over the vacated streets.
The cities of this State are authorized by section-167.09, F.S.1955, F.S.A. to discontinue any street and the plaintiff has not shown -that the exercise of the power by the city in this instance constitutes a wrongful invasion of any personal or property right of the plaintiff.
The allegations of the complaint tend to show that the public had an easement by prescription over the unnamed street vacated and there is no proof tending to-overcome the prima facie, showing that the public hás an easement by prescription over Church Street. By use of Church Street it appears that appellant will have adequate means of ingress and egress.
No error of the Chancellor having been made to appear, the decree appealed from is Affirmed. DREW, C. J., and HOBSON and THORNAL, JJ., concur. : ,
DREW, C. J.
(concurring specially).
In addition to the reasons assigned in the foregoing opinion, I think the case is clearly controlled by the holding o'f-this Court in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Joachim, 146 Fla. 50, 200 So. 238.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co. v. City OF Miami, 104 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)…if the power to vacate is present and if such power is lawfully exercised. Loeffler v. Roe, Fla.1953, 69 So. 2d 331, 339; Henry L. Doherty & Co., Inc., v. Joachim, 146 Fla. 50, 200 So. 238; § 167.09, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and McLeod v. Carr, Fla.1956, 90 So. 2d 112. We conclude that the appellee-city, by the enactment, pursuant to its authority to do so, of the aforementioned ordinances, together with evidence of non-use, abandoned the north 10 feet of the dedicated [*854] strip and pursuant to the terms of t…
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SUN OIL Co. v. Gerstein, 206 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)…al court, and in view of our prior conclusions, we deem it sufficient to state that appellees have not shown that the exercise of the city's authority in this instance has resulted in an invasion of any property right. See McLeod v. Carr, Fla. 1956, 90 So. 2d 112. Therefore, for the reasons above expressed, the order appealed must be reversed. Reversed.…
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Hurt v. Lenchuk, 223 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)…ve the obstructions across the south end of the vacated portion of the street. The cities of this state are authorized to discontinue or vacate any street or portion thereof when done in the interest of the general welfare. McLeod v. Carr, Fla.1956, 90 So. 2d 112; Section 167.09, F.S.1963, F.S.A. The plaintiffs’ efforts to establish the invalidity of the ordinance by which the street was vacated were unsuccessful and the ordinance is thus presumptively valid. When a street is lawfully vacated, title to the a…
Authorities Cited
- Henry L. Doherty & Co., Inc. v. Joachim, 146 Fla. 50 (Fla. 1941)