GARY HURA REED, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF CLEARWATER, A FLORIDA MUNICIPALITY, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2005-03-16
No. 2D03-5405
STRINGER and CANADY, JJ., Concur.
899 So. 2d 343 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2005) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Gary Reed appeals an order denying his motion for return of property in a civil forfeiture proceeding where a default final judgment had been entered against him forfeiting $26,099 to the City of Clearwater. The court affirmed the denial of Reed's motion but noted he may have alternative remedies for recovering tangible personal property that was not subject to the forfeiture proceeding.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Reed's motion for return of property, holding that Reed had no right to relief from the default final judgment through the motion filed and that tangible personal property not subject to the forfeiture proceeding could not be recovered in that proceeding. However, Reed may pursue recovery of such property through separate action or other proceedings.


Headnotes

[1] A motion for return of property filed within a civil forfeiture proceeding after a default final judgment has been entered is subject to the rules governing relief from j…

[2] A party seeking relief from a default final judgment in a forfeiture proceeding must state a claim for relief under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540.

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Key Quotes

“Because Mr. Reed is not entitled to relief from the judgment, we affirm. However, we do so without prejudice to any right Mr. Reed might have to file a proper motion or proceeding seeking the return of other tangible personal property that was not subject to the forfeiture proceeding.”

States the court's holding and preserves Reed's right to pursue alternative remedies for property not subject to forfeiture

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Facts & Procedural History

The City of Clearwater seized $26,099 from Gary Reed when he was arrested on November 5, 2001, for conspiracy to commit armed trafficking in cocaine. …

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Opinion of the Court
ALTENBERND, Chief Judge.

ALTENBERND, Chief Judge.

Gary Reed appeals an order denying his motion for return of property. The motion was filed in a civil forfeiture proceeding after a default final judgment had been entered against Mr. Reed. Because Mr. Reed is not entitled to relief from the judgment, we affirm. However, we do so without prejudice to any right Mr. Reed might have to file a proper motion or proceeding seeking the return of other tangible personal property that was not subject to the forfeiture proceeding.

On December 20, 2001, the City of Clearwater filed a complaint seeking forfeiture of $26,099 that was seized from Mr. Reed when Mr. Reed was arrested on November 5, 2001, for conspiracy to commit armed trafficking in cocaine. An attorney filed a notice of appearance and accepted service of the forfeiture complaint on behalf of Mr. Reed but did not file an answer to the complaint. Thereafter, upon the proper motion of the City and after a hearing that neither Mr. Reed nor his counsel attended, a default final judgment of forfeiture was entered on May 15, 2002, forfeiting the $26,099 to the City. Apparently, Mr. Reed was personally unaware of these developments.

Sometime in May 2003, Mr. Reed made an inquiry, seeking the return of a portion of these funds and also some tangible personal property that was seized from him. After some bureaucratic confusion, Mr. Reed filed a “motion for return of property” in the forfeiture proceeding on September 12, 2003. The motion sought the return of a portion of the $26,099 and certain tangible personal property. The personal property that was listed in the motion had not been the subject of the forfeiture proceeding. From the description of these items, it is possible that they were items of personal property removed from Mr. Reed when he was booked on these charges. The trial court summarily denied this motion.

Because the final judgment of forfeiture was entered on May 15, 2002, Mr. Reed’s only potential avenue for relief in the forfeiture proceedings was to seek relief from the judgment. However, Mr. Reed has not stated a claim for relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, nor does it appear that the circumstances would permit such a claim. We therefore affirm the order denying Mr. Reed’s motion.

To the extent Mr. Reed requested the return of his tangible personal property, those items were not the subject of this forfeiture proceeding and could not be recovered in that proceeding. Mr. Reed may still be able to pursue the recovery of these items through a separate action against the appropriate agency or possibly by renewing a motion for return of property that he apparently filed in his initial criminal proceedings pursuant to section 705.105, Florida Statutes (2001).

Affirmed.

STRINGER and CANADY, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Wilson v. State, 957 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …pursuant to section 705.105(1). If he seeks relief from a forfeiture judgment, he may only be able to proceed under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 if he is able to establish a basis for relief under that rule. See Reed v. City of Clearwater, 899 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). If he seeks relief from the disposition of funds pursuant to section 705.105(1), his claim may be untimely because it was not filed within sixty days after the conclusion of the criminal proceeding. See Sarmiento v. State, 8…

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