WESTON COLEMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Weston Coleman appealed the trial court's summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming a fundamental sentencing error in the pronouncement of his sentence for possession of cocaine. The court reversed and remanded, finding a discrepancy between the trial court's oral pronouncement and written sentencing documents that required resentencing.
The trial court's sentence was illegal and must be vacated. Because a discrepancy existed between the written order and oral pronouncement, and the State did not concede the written order was in error, the trial court must conduct a factual determination and resentence Coleman to resolve the conflict.
[1] When a written sentencing order is inconsistent with the oral pronouncement of sentence, the oral pronouncement generally prevails.
[2] A trial court must resentence a defendant when there is a conflict between the written sentencing order and the oral pronouncement, and the State does not concede the wri…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court's clear intent was to impose the sixteen-year sentence for sale of cocaine, the only second-degree felony conviction.”
Establishes the court's determination of the trial court's actual sentencing intent regarding the habitual felony offender enhancement.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceColeman entered guilty pleas to sale and possession of cocaine and failure to appear, with a sentencing cap of sixteen years. On December 3, 2002, the…
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SALCINES, Judge.
Weston Coleman appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse the order of the trial court and remand with directions for the trial court to vacate the sentences and to resentence Coleman.
Coleman entered guilty pleas in two cases to sale and possession of cocaine and failure to appear in exchange for a cap of sixteen years for any sentence imposed. On December 3, 2002, the trial court convicted him of and sentenced him for the offenses. In his motion to correct illegal sentence, Coleman asserts that there is a fundamental sentencing error in the judge’s oral pronouncement of his sentence for possession of cocaine, a second-degree felony. The written sentencing documents show that the trial court sentenced him to sixteen years’ prison, suspended after ten years and followed by six years’ probation on the sale of cocaine, five years’ prison on the possession of cocaine, and ten years’ prison on the failure to appear as a habitual offender, all concurrent. The written documents do not indicate that the trial court imposed a habitual felony offender sentence for the sale of cocaine. However, the sentencing transcript shows that the trial court summarized the State’s required proof for habitual felony offender sentencing and declared that the habitual felony offender sentence applied to all three convictions. It appears that the trial court misstated the sentence for the sale of cocaine by pronouncing “on the second-degree felony possession of cocaine, I’m imposing 16 years with the last six suspended.”
The State acknowledged in the response ordered by this court that possession of cocaine was not subject to habitual felony offender sentencing. See § 775.084(l)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). It further responded that the trial court obviously intended to sentence the appellant as a habitual offender to sixteen years’ prison for the sale of cocaine conviction. See O’Neal v. State, 862 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
The trial court’s clear intent was to impose the sixteen-year sentence for sale of cocaine, the only second-degree felony conviction. Because a discrepancy exists between the written order and the oral pronouncement of sentence, the trial court must resentence Coleman. Generally, when the trial court’s written order is inconsistent with its oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement prevails. Cunningham v. State, 818 So. 2d 685, 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). However, when the State does not concede that the written order is in error, as in the present case, remand is appropriate for the trial court to make a factual determination to resolve the conflict between the written order and the oral pronouncement. Id.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court with regard to the sentences imposed with directions for the trial court to vacate those sentences and to resen-tence Coleman.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
NORTHCUTT and CASANUEVA, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
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Shepard v. State, 940 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…that because the oral pronouncement conflicted with the written sentence, this court would have the authority to remand the case back to the trial court to resolve the conflict between the written order and the oral pronouncement. Coleman v. State, 898 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Therefore, the state contends the trial judge had the authority to resolve the conflict before the filing of a notice of appeal. We cannot accept this argument because, unlike Coleman, the trial court’s oral pronouncement in…
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Chapman v. State, 14 So. 3d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…cord demonstrates that during oral pronouncement of sentence, trial court made inconsistent statements, matter must be remanded to clarify sentence imposed and enter such corrected sentencing orders as may be appropriate); see also Coleman v. State, 898 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Here, in its written order denying Chapman’s motion to cor [*275] rect illegal sentence, the trial court clarified the sentence imposed. AFFIRMED. MONACO, C.J. and COHEN, JJ., concur. . §§ 893.135(l)(f) and 893.03(2)(c)(2), Fl…
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Franklin v. State, 969 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…rror, a conflict between the written order and the oral pronouncement requires a factual resolution by the trial court. Ellis v. State, 816 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Tory v. State, 686 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also Coleman v. State, 898 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Enchautegui v. State, 749 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). We have also stated, “[wjhere the record demonstrates that during the oral pronouncement of sentence, the trial judge made inconsistent statements, the matter must be reman…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- O'Neal v. State, 862 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Cunningham v. State, 818 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)