CARTER G. HAWKINS, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
MARY G. HAWKINS, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this Florida family law appeal, the court affirmed a trial court's final judgment partitioning marital real property and terminating alimony as of January 30, 2002, but reversed and remanded on the issue of whether an accounting was required for expenses paid on the former marital residence after the alimony termination date.
The court affirmed the trial court's treatment of pre-termination-date payments as alimony and its termination of alimony as of January 30, 2002, but reversed the denial of the accounting request because in a partition proceeding, an accounting is necessary to determine whether each co-tenant has paid their proportionate share of expenses and to adjust the co-tenants' accounts accordingly. The court also affirmed that the trial court retained jurisdiction over alimony issues through its reservation language.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by treating pre-termination tax, interest, mortgage, and maintenance payments on a former marital residence as in the nature o…
[2] In a partition proceeding, an accounting is necessary to determine each co-tenant's proportionate share of property expenses and to adjust their accounts accordingly.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“For the period after January 30, 2002, however, the husband was entitled to 'an accounting of funds [expended] for the [former marital] property.'”
Establishes that Mr. Hawkins was entitled to an accounting of post-termination expenses, reversing the trial court's denial of this request.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUpon dissolution of the parties' marriage, Carter and Mary Hawkins became joint tenants of their former marital residence. The trial court terminated …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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[*1156] PER CURIAM.
Carter G. Hawkins appeals a final judgment partitioning real property, and Mary G. Hawkins cross appeals termination of her alimony. We affirm the final judgment, except insofar as it denies Mr. Hawkins’s request for an accounting as to the marital residence since January 30, 2002. On this issue only, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Upon dissolution of the parties’ marriage, they became joint tenants of what had been the marital residence. In the judgment under review, the trial court terminated alimony as of January 30, 2002. The trial court treated Mr. Hawkins’s tax, interest, mortgage, and maintenance payments made before that date as in the nature of alimony. We find no abuse of discretion in this treatment. For the period after January 30, 2002, however, the husband was entitled to “an accounting of funds [expended] for the [former marital] property.” See Bermudez Y Santos v. Bermudez Y Santos, 773 So. 2d 568, 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (“The husband and mother also point out that in a partition proceeding it is necessary for there to be an accounting to determine whether each co-tenant has paid his or her proportionate share of the expenses of the property, and adjust the co-tenants’ accounts accordingly. That is correct. See Biondo v. Powers, 743 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Hernandez v. Hernandez, 645 So. 2d 171, 173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).”). “Once that has been accomplished the parties can make such arguments as they deem appropriate on the fashioning of further relief in this case.” Id.
On cross appeal, Ms. Hawkins does not challenge the trial court’s decision to terminate Mr. Hawkins’s alimony obligation as of January 30, 2002, but does argue that the trial court improperly failed to retain jurisdiction to order alimony in the future, if circumstances change. Mr. Hawkins answers that the trial court did retain jurisdiction when it stated that “[t]he Court reserves jurisdiction over this cause to enforce or modify the terms of this Final Judgment as may from time to time become necessary.” We agree that this language was sufficient to retain jurisdiction on the issue of alimony. See Zoercher v. Zoercher, 114 So. 2d 728, 731 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959) (holding that where divorce decree provided that the court retained jurisdiction “to make from time to time such orders as may from time to time become proper,” even though such language did not specifically refer to alimony, it was “sufficient to retain jurisdiction on the question of alimony”).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BENTON, LEWIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Anne Gergen v. Gergen, 48 So. 3d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…propriety of a grant of nominal alimony under appropriate circumstances, the foregoing cases stand for the proposition that such a method is sufficient, but not necessary, to reserve jurisdiction over a future alimony award. See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 895 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Analogies to the deferral of child custody determinations, where the evidence presented makes the matter ripe for final determination, are unpersuasive. See Gruner v. Westmark, 617 So. 2d 420, 421-22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (…
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Schroeder v. Lawhon, 922 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…f the property, the parties each had an obligation to pay their proportionate share of the obligations and expenses of the property, including the real estate taxes. See Burnett v. Burnett, 742 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 895 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); O’Donnell v. Marks, 823 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Bermudez y Santos v. Bermudez y Santos, 773 So. 2d 568, 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). In the partial summary judgment entered previously, the trial court had ruled tha…
Authorities Cited
- Hernandez v. Walfrido Hernandez, 645 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Biondo v. Althea A. Powers, 743 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Diomedes Raul Bermudez Y Santos and Melba Bermudez v. Santos, 773 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Zoercher v. Zoercher, 114 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)