ELVIN W. ELDER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the appellant could not be convicted of grand theft of an automobile solely based on knowledge that the vehicle was stolen, without evidence of participation in the theft itself.
Appellant was found attempting to remove a muffler from a car and admitted to doing so for a friend. He also stated he knew the car had been stolen by…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Elements Of Theft cases and more on FLexlaw
KLEIN, J.
Appellant was convicted of grand theft of an automobile, burglary of a conveyance, and petit theft. The trial court should have acquitted him of grand theft because there was no evidence that he took the automobile.
Appellant was found by an officer — who had been informed that there was a car stripping in progress — attempting to remove a muffler from the car. In response to the officer’s questions, appellant advised that he did not own the vehicle and that he was removing the muffler for a friend. After being read his Miranda rights appellant, according to the officer, stated that he knew the vehicle had been stolen by another person.
Appellant argues he could not be convicted of grand theft of the auto under State v. G.C., 572 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1991). In G.C. the juvenile accepted a ride from a friend in a vehicle which he assumed was stolen because it had a broken steering column. Our supreme court held that the mere fact that he became a passenger after the vehicle was stolen, even if he knew it was stolen, would not support a conviction for theft. The element of depriving or appropriating the vehicle from the owner, section 812.014, Florida Statutes (2003), was not satisfied.
In this case, as in G.C., there was no evidence that appellant committed any theft except for the muffler, which appellant admitted he was removing. We accordingly reverse the conviction for grand theft of an auto, making it unnecessary for us to reach his argument that his convictions for petit theft and grand theft amounted to double jeopardy. Reversed.
GUNTHER and MAY, JJ„ concur.